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THE IMPACT OF THE GULF CRISIS 
ON THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY* 
M a n o B Lamberte and Josef T Yap** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It seems that every ten years an oil shock comes with profound impact on the economies of 
oil importing developing countries The last oil shock was particularly disruptive to the 
Philippines since it came when the economy was struggling to overcome a senous budget deficit 
and the external debt problem It also occuiTed in time of natural calamities such as a prolonged 
drought, a devastating typhoon andearthquake, which visited the Philippines one after the other 
and crippled many of its productive assets 
This study analyzes the impact of the recent Gulf cnsis on the Philippine economy anfl 
reviews the measures adopted by the government in response to that crisis Its specific aims are 
1 To describe the current state of the Philippine economy and the energy policy of the 
government, 1 
2 To document and descnbe In detail the policy measures adopted by the government to 
deal with the impact of the Gulf crisis 
3 To assess the impact of the Gulf cnsis on the balance of payments employment, and 
the budget, 
4 To perform, simulations, using the PIDS NEDA Macroeconoraetnc Model for both 
direct and indirect impact on important macroecononuc variables unde^ different 
scenarios, and 
i 
5 To recommend steps/approaches for both the government and the international 
organizations for dealing with the adverse impact of the Gulf pnsis or similar future 
situations on the Philippine economy 
A section is devoted to the discussion of each of the above objectives 
study was maddpossiblethrough the financial support of the Asian Development Bank 
**Vice President ant^Research Fellow respectively of the Philippine Institute for Development Studies 
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n. THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY AND ENERGY POUCY 
To appreciate the government's response to the Gulf crisis, it is important to provide a brief 
background of the state of the economy and of the energy policy at the time the crisis occurred. 
A. The Philippine Economy 
From the 1984-1985 crisis, the Philippine economy recovered remarkably during the second 
half of the 1980s. GNP growth rate during that period averaged 6.1 percent, while on the first half 
of the 1980s it averaged -0.9 percent. 
However, the recovery started to lose steam in 1989 when GNP growth rate fell from die 
target 6.5 to 5.7 percent That year, interest rates in the international and domestic markets went 
up, exacting an additional toll on the country's external debt burden and on the government 
budget deficit Hopes for sustained recoveiy were shattered by a bloody coup d'etat in December. 
In addition, a major drought occurred toward the last quarter of 1989 and lasted up to the second 
quarter 1990, causing huge damage to crops and serious power shortages. Several hydroelectric 
power generators could not be operated due to low water level in dams, and the resulting 
inadequate power supply badly hurt the manufacturing sector. 
Thus, the Philippine economy entered 1990 battered by these external and internal shocks. In 
July, a powerful earthquake shook the Philippines' northern part causing severe damage to lives, 
properties, and infrastructure. A major export processing zone in Baguio City was crippled. Less 
than a month later, the Gulf crisis erupted. Then a major typhoon hit Region 7, an important 
export-oriented region. Cebu City, the country's second largest city, was without water and 
electricity for weeks. Finally, the economy managed to grow by only 3.7 percent that year. 
When the Gulf crisis struck, the Philippines was in the middle of a three-year International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) extended program that started in 1989. It failed to meet almost all the 
performance criteria. For instance, the actual consolidated public sector deficit posted 5.2 percent 
of GNP in 1990, but the target level was 2.9 percent The targeted inflation rate was 7 percent, 
but tt^ g actual figure was twice. 
Yflfaile external shocks certainly undermined the IMF program, inappropriate policy actions, 
such as policy slippages in the monetary and fiscal sectors, also contributed to (he economy's 
failure to meet the performance criteria. The IMF suspended the program in October 1990 when 
it saw no sigh of the economy going back to the original track. After long negotiations, the 
Philippines secured in February 1991 the IMF approval for a Stand-By Arrangement and 
Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility. 
B. Energy Policy 
1. Institutional Arrangements 
The energy objectives of the Philippines are as follows: (1) on the supply side, to ensure the 
availability of energy to the local markets at reasonable prices; (2) on the demand side, to 
promote the judicious and efficient use of energy resources; and (3) on the environmental side, to 
accomplish both objectives with minimal adverse effects on the environment1. 
1. See Office of Energy Affairs, The Philippine Medium- Term Energy Plan, 1988-1992. 
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To carry out the objectives, President Aquino created the Energy Coordinating Council 
(ECC) through Executive Order No. 338 dated 30 September 1988. The ECC is composed of the 
Executive Secretary to the President, the Executive Director of the Office of Energy Affairs 
(OEA), the President of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), the President of the 
National Power Corporation (NPC), and the Administrator of the National Electrification 
Administration (NEA) (Chart 1). 
Following are the Council's powers and functions: 
1. Review and formally ratify the energy plan, including the power expansion program of 
government agencies and corporations; 
2. Make appropriate representations to the Investment Coordinating Committee, or the 
government agency responsible for investment fund appropriations, to ensure that 
energy sector investments are consistent with the approved energy plan; 
3. Analyze, coordinate, and, with the approval of the President, initiate major energy and 
power development projects that require the utilization of funds available to the 
government; 
4. Coordinate the implementation of approved projects to assist in their timely 
completion; 
5. As the need arises, such as during anticipated energy or power shortage, determine 
and recommend to the President the appropriate course of action; and 
6. Exercise such other powers and functions as the President may direct 
Each of the offices mentioned above plays an important and distinct role in attaining ECC's 
objectives. The OEA formulates, plans, monitors, implements, and coordinates policies and 
programs in the field of energy . As regards the last function, it coordinates all activities which 
the government may need to undertake in relation to the exploration, development, marketing, 
distribution, storage, and efficient utilization of energy resources from fossil fuels such as 
petroleum, coal, natural gas and gas liquids, nuclear-fuel resources, geothermal resources, 
hydroelectric resources, and existing and potential forms of non- conventional energy. The OEA 
Executive Director is the President's official adviser on energy affairs. He is, therefore, 
considered as the country's energy czar. 
The PNOC was created in 1973 through Presidential Decree (PD) No. 334. Its objectives are: 
(1) to provide and maintain an adequate and stable supply of oil and petroleum products for the 
domestic requirement; (2) to promote the exploration, exploitation, and development of local oil 
and petroleum sources; and (3) to foster oil or petroleum operation conditions conducive to a 
balanced and sustainable growth of the company. 
The PNOC has several subsidiaries, including PNOC Marine Corp., for ship building and 
repair; PNOC Coal Corp. and Bislig Coal Corp., for coal mining; PNOC Energy Supply Base, 
Inc., for oil equipment and supply shortage and maintenance; Filoil Refinery Corp., for oil 
refinery and processing; Petron Corp., for marketing; PNOC Energy Development Corp., for 
geothermal energy development; PNOC Exploration Coip., for oil exploration; PNOC Shipping 
2. Executive Order No. 193, dated 10 June 1987. 
H 
0 
z 
0 
0 
SCJ 
g z 
mH 
SH 
V w® 
(H zZ 
ni HH 
£ ofl 
0 uK 
feo 
°U 
> 
0 
K 
w 
z 
w 
5 
and Transport Corp., which operates the domestic oil transport; and four firms which operate and 
manage four PNOC international tankers. 
In 1987, PNOC was given the control not only over its existing geothermal operations, but 
also over other geothermal reservations that it may discover, identify, and develops. 
The NPC generates and supplies power to the distribution utilities. It also services some 
industrial customers directly while the local franchises are still unable to meet higher power 
demand by some industries. Under P0 No. 40 dated 7 November 1072, NPC had the sole 
authority to build and operate power plants in the country. But in 1987, power generation was 
liberalized. The government started to allow the private sector to participate in power generation 
through such schemes as cogeneration, build-own-operate (BOO), and build-operate-transfer 
(BOT)4. Still, the strategic and rational development of the country's power grids remains 
NPC's responsibility. 
The NEA implements a nationwide rural electrification program. It organizes small private 
utilities and cooperatives which supply electricity to households in the rural areas. Large private 
utility firms, like the Manila Electric Co. (MERALCO), supply electricity to residential, 
commercial, and industrial customers in urban areas. 
Friction among the four agencies appears occasionally. Once, PNOC wanted to expand into 
geothermal power generation and operation of mine-mouth (coal-fired) power plants near its coal 
mines. This would have encroached on the functions of NPC. 
An important player in the energy sector but not included in the ECC structure because of its 
quasi-judicial character is the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB). It is designed to be an 
independent government agency. It is authorized to regulate the importation, export, shipping, 
transport, processing, refining, marketing, and distribution of energy. Its specific functions are: 
(1) to fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products; (2) to fix and regulate the rate schedule 
or prices of j)iped gas to be charged by duly franchised gas companies; (3) to fix and regulate the 
rates of pipeline concessionaires; (4) to regulate the capacities of new refineries or the additional 
capacities of existing refineries, and to license refineries; and (5) to take steps it may consider 
necessary, including temporary adjustment of price levels of petroleum products and payment to 
the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). 
2. Pricing Policy 
The government controls energy pricing in the country. A key feature of its pricing policy on 
petroleum products is the OPSF, the main function of which is to absorb the shocks brought 
about by fluctuations in the world prices of crude oil and in foreign exchange rates, thus, 
minimizing the frequency of adjustment in the domestic prices of petroleum products5. The Fund 
is used to reimburse the three oil companies in the country for their excess importation costs 
above the reference crude price and the peso-dollar exchange rate set by the ERB . Conversely, 
the oil companies deposit into the OPSF the resulting peso cost differential if actual import costs 
are lower than the reference rates7. 
3. Executive Order No. 223, dated 16 July 1987. 
4. Executive Order No. 215, dated 10 July 1987. 
5. Executive Order No. 137, dated 27 February 1987. 
6. The three oil companies are the government-owned Petron and the multinationals Shell and Caltex. 
7. Taken from Office of Energy Affairs, The Philippine Medium-Term Energy Plan, 1988-1992. 
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Table 16 (continued) 
Price Structure of Retail Prices for Petro'eum Produgts, 
1 January 1991 (In pesos per liter) 
Direct specific . Wholesale Hauling Dealers' Pump 
Company Tax OPSF Posted Price Price Pric« 
Recovery Price 
Premium Gasoline 7. 2047 2. 52 5.6549 
Regular Gasoline 6. 6953 2. 28 5.4713 
Avturbo 10. 4837 2. 38 2.5265 
Kerosene 11. 0627 0. 5 (4.34) 
Diesel 8. 4138 0. 45 (1.66) 
Fuel Oil/ 
Feedstock 4. 7334 0 0.4246 
LPG 7. 0247 0 (1.41) 
Asphalts 5. 0481 0. 56 5.6367 
Solvents 7. 04 0 5.9749 
Average 6. 8421 0. 598 0.288 
15.3796 0. 092 0.4748 15. 9E 
14.4466 0. 092 0.4554 15 
15.3902 0 0 0 
7.2226 0. 092 0.4307 7. 7E 
7.2066 0. 092 0.4504 7. 11 
5.158 0 0 0 
5.6111 0 0 0 
11.2448 0 0 0 
13.0149 0 0 0 
7.728 
Source: Energy Regulatory Board. 
7 
Later, a forward foreign exchange cover was added to the feature of the Fund. This allowed 
the oil companies to recover from the Fund financing costs for crude oil importations, which 
represent the difference between the peso-dollar exchange rate at the time of availment of trade 
credit and the exchange rate at the time of settlement or repayment of such credit8. This was to 
encourage oil companies to obtain credits with longer maturities for their crude oil purchases. 
The OPSF used to provide forward foreign exchange cover of up to 360 days, but this was 
reduced to 180 days beginning September 1990. For this cover, the OPSF charges oil companies 
a risk fee equivalent to a flat rate of 2 percent for a maximum period of 180 days of cover. 
The OPSF used to provide oil price subsidy to the NPC on a per liter basis. That is, oil 
companies sold fuel oil to NPC at subsidized rate, but the subsidy was to be recouped by 
charging higher prices for other petroleum products. This subsidy was removed in January 1991. 
The same cross-subsidization scheme is being followed in subsidizing certain petroleum 
products, like kerosene, diesel, and liquified petroleum gas (LPG). 
Until the creation of the Petroleum Price Stabilization Fund, the OPSF was a self-liquidating 
buffer mechanism. In 1990, Congress appropriated PS billion to partly pay the accrued OPSF 
arrears. This virtually converted the OPSF into a subsidy mechanism. 
The present structure of the retail prices for petroleum products consists of direct company 
take, specific tax, contribution to OPSF, the hauling price, and the dealers' margin (Table 1). 
Table 2 shows how the last increase in the price of petroleum products was distributed among 
OPSF claims on product sales, peso cost differential, foreign exchange risk fee, and subsidy on 
sales to NPC. 
The government plans to deregulate the oil industry, i.e., shift to market-based oil pricing 
system. Some aspects of the deregulation, such as removal of NPC subsidy, took effect on 1 
January 1991. The deregulation involves the following measures9: 
1. Discontinuance, effective 1 July 1990, of the foreign exchange forward cover provided 
to oil companies. 
2. Elimination of the power rates subsidy through the OPSF. This means the NPC would 
have to adjust its tariff rates to achieve a certain positive rate of return. 
3. Shifting from ad valorem tax on oil to specific tax. 
4. Allowing more competition in some aspects of the oil industry, such as transport, 
importation of oil products, etc. 
5. Allowing the PNOC to expand its distribution and refinery capacity and accelerating 
its development of geothermal energy sources. 
On electricity pricing, three government agencies are involved in setting and regulating 
electricity tariffs. The ERB approves the rates charged by privately-owned electric utilities. The 
NPC determines its own bulk rates with the approval of the Cabinet The NEA sets the tariff 
structure of electric cooperatives10. MERALCO, the biggest privately-owned distribution utility 
8. Gomez, 1990. 
9. Gomez, 1990. 
10. Office of Energy Affairs, The Philippine Medium-Term Energy Plan, 1988-1992. 
Table 16 
Distribution of the Latest Price increase 
(In pesos per liter) 
OPSF Claims on Product Sales 
(Per November - December 1990 
price build-up) 0 .9770 
Add: Other Allowable Claims 
Peso Cost Differential 
(Forex cover) 1. 8123 
Forex Risk Fee (0. 0896) 
Subsidy on Sales to NPC 0. 1203 1 .8430 
NEEDED INCREASE 2 .8200 
Source: Energy Regulatory Board. 
9 
firm, follows a socialized pricing scheme wherein the residential and small commercial 
customers consuming not more than 50 KWH per month are subsidized by the industrial and 
other large consumers of electricity. This subsidy will soon be eliminated. 
The overall impact of the Philippines' energy policy in the 1980s may be seen in Table 3. The 
percentage share of indigenous energy to total energy consumption has risen consistently until 
1986, then continually declined thereafter. In 1990, imported energy constituted 65.1 percent of 
the total energy consumed compared to 55.7 percent in 1986 when the present administration 
took over the reins of government 
The present administration has not put much emphasis on expanding the domestic supply of 
energy to reduce the countiy's dependence on imported energy. One of the reasons is that the 
price of crude oil in the international market had been relatively low during the period 1986-1989 
(Table 4). As will be pointed out below, the Philippines is now paying for reversing the energy 
policy established in the eariy 1980s. 
In 1990, imported oil consisted of 63.2 percent of total energy consumption, up from 53.4 
percent in 1986. Its implication on the Philippines trade balance is seen in Table 4. Oil import 
was about 16.6 percent of total import bill and 22 percent of total export bill in 1990, up from 
their 1989 levels. With the debt- service burden amounting to about 40 percent of the country's 
total exports, any increase in the world price of crude oil would have a profound effect on the 
domestic economy. 
The Philippines has been dependent increasingly on the Middle East for its crude oil imports 
(Table 5). In 1988, 67.5 percept of its total crude oil imports came from that region. This 
increased to 75 percent in 1989, and to 83 percent in 1990. This indicates the vulnerability of the 
Philippines to any disruptive development in the Middle East. 
3. Energy Conservation Measures 
Even before the Gulf crisis. the government has been carrying out an energy conservation 
program. As part of the response to the first oil shock, the government launched in 1975 the 
Energy Conservation Movement At present this task has been assigned to the Conservation 
Division of the Office of Energy Affairs. The program includes the following activities11: 
a. Energy Management Training Courses and Seminars - These training courses have 
three-fold objectives: (i) to provide the participants with a proper perspective of the 
government's efforts, thrust and goals; (ii) to impart to the participants tools and 
techniques to enable them to design, initiate and implement energy management and 
conservation programs in their respective establishments; and (iii) to equip the 
participants with various operational measures and practices in achieving fuel 
economy in high-energy consuming equipment/processes. The participants come 
from the/industry, transport and commercial Sectors which are large consumers of 
energy. 
11. This is based on the Philippine Medium-Term Energy Plan, 1988-1992. 
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b. Energy Audit Assistance - The Office of Energy Affairs provides energy audit 
assistance to industrial, transport and commercial establishments in. order to identify 
ways and means of improving energy utilization efficiency. 
- 'J 
c. Energy Briefings - The Office of Energy Affairs conducts energy briefings for 
univertflis^priyats entities, gudgoyernment agencies. 
d. Energy Conservation Publication - The Office of Energy Affairs features energy 
eonsemtion success^ stories of selected ptantr t^est^li^fflerits^tlntragh the Energy 
Conservation Journal. 
e. Industry Energy Efficiency Program - Establishments consuming more than one 
million fuel oil equivalent liters of energy per annum are required to submit quarterly 
energy consumption reports to the Office of Energy Affairs. The idea is to establish 
an energy efficiency monitoring system with each establishment. 
There is no way to accurately measure the effectiveness of these programs. Giyen that the 
energy/GDP ratio has been continuously rising since 1981, one cannot help but conclude that the 
energy conservation programs have been less effective in attaining their ob^ctivgs (Chaft 2). 
- J - IS1 * S3"" 1 
4. EJaerg^ Development Efforts 
Major efforts to develop the"supi$y otfbnergy in the cguntry stai^d iifthe «trly 1970s. The 
Oil Exploration Act was promulgated in 1972. It changed the system for oil exploration £rom the 
antiquated concession system to the service contract system. The first oil discovery in offshore 
Palawan ogpurred in 1976. Mso~ifr-this year the Coal Development Act which outlined a 
program to effectively exptore and exploit coal reserves was promulgated. The following year, 
the first geothermal pilot power was commissioned. This was followed in subsequent years by 
the commissioning of other geothermal plants located in various places of the country.- All these 
efforts led to the diversification of the sources of conventional indigenous energy in the country. 
5. Constraints to Energy Policy Reforms 
# i 
The creation of the Department of Energy to rationalize and integrate energy policies and 
prografns implementation was* perhaps an important'milestone in ®'e "annils of energy 
policy-making in the codfrtry. Unfortunately^ however, energy issues had becdttie highly 
politicized. The Department became an i^portant^ource of rent-seeking activities by the Marcos 
regime. The head of the Department was one of the "cronies" of Mr. Marcos. When the Aquino 
governmdtti tbcfe bvep^H abolished the Department afetn 1 retained* loun Agencies under the 
supervision of the Energy Coordinating Council chaired by the Executive Secretary. Being very 
busy with the affairs of the Malacanang Palace, the Executive Secretary could not attend to 
energy affairs as much as a full-time Energy Secretary would do. Coordination of energy policy 
and affairs has therefore become a problem with the four agencies exerting their own authority. 
On top of it, energy issues have become highly politicized. As always been the case with highly 
politicized commodity, energy policies tend to bend to populist pressure. The lack of leadership 
in the energy sector and the highly politicized nature of energy issues have become serious 
constraints to instituting energy policy reforms. The government needs political will to 
disentangle itself from these problems. 
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Chart 2 
ENERGY AND PETROLEUM INTENSITY 
Y E A R 
B E n e r g y / G D P r a t i o P e t r o l e u m / G D P r a t i * 
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III. POLICY MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO DEAL WITH 
THE IMPACT OF THE GULF CRISIS 
This section discusses the measures adopted by the government to deal with the adverse 
impact of the Gulf crisis on the domestic economy. 
A. Repatriation of and Assistance to OCWs 
There is no precise figure on the number of Filipino overseas contract workers (OCWs) in the 
Middle East since many of them went to the area illegally. The official estimate is that there were 
about half a million Filipino OCWs in the Middle East as of January 1991. Seventy-nine percent 
of the total were in Saudi Arabia (Table 6). At the outbreak of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, the 
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) estimated that there were about 63,000 
legal and illegal Filipino OCWs in both Kuwait and Iraq. 
The first measure taken by the government when the Iraq- Kuwait conflict broke out was to 
move those Filipino OCWs in the war zone to safer grounds and, eventually, repatriate those who 
wished to come home. This task fell on the Iraq-Kuwait Task Force organized by the Department 
of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Later, a presidential task force headed by the OWWA 
administrator and the general manager of Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) was 
formed and dispatched to the Middle East to deal with the problems of acute food shortage and 
break-out of diseases among Filipinos in evacuation centers. 
The government made arrangements with some Middle East countries for the 
government-owned Philippine Air Lines (PAL) to have more flights to ferry Filipinos wanting to 
go home . PAL made a total of 83 flights, both chartered and regular, supplemented by 78 
chartered and regular commercial flights commissioned by the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), to ferry Filipinos from Amman, Joi^an and Basra, Iraq to Manila. OWWA 
reports showed that as of 1 March 1991, about 30,000 Fpipinos had been repatriated. 
OCWs who returned home immediately faced a big problem. The Central Bank temporarily 
stopped its Arab currency exchange operations, prompting financial institutions to refuse 
accepting Arab currencies. OWWA responded by opening a foreign currency booth at the NAIA 
to buy Arab currencies at 99 percent of Central Bank rates on the day of closure of its Arab 
currency exchange operations. OWWA purchased P6.8 million worth of Kuwait, Iraqi and Saudi 
currencies, benefitting 2,340 OCWs before the Central Bank resumed its Arab currency exchange 
operations. 
OWWA provided further financial assistance to affected OCWs. On 20 August 1990, it 
opened a loan facility called Emergency Family Assistance Loan (EFAL). Evacuees may borrow 
up to P3,000 per family to meet their most pressing needs. Interest rate charged on the loan was 8 
percent per annun* equivalent to one-third of the market rate, with a six-month moratorium on 
payments. As of 31 August 1991, about 8,000 beneficiaries have availed of this loan facility. The 
total drawdown reached P25.6 million. 
it 
12. The information here are based on an unpublished document entitled "OWWA's Response to the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict" 
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On 6 September 1990, OWWA opened another loan facility called Special Family Assistance 
Loan (SFAL). It was intended to help families of Filipino OCWs still stranded in Kuwait or in 
evacuation centers in the Middle East. As of 31 August 1991, more than 200 families of OCWs 
availed of this facility. The total amount bonrowed was P2.0 million. 
The biggest problem faced by returning OCWs was finding a job in a tight domestic labor 
market It was hard for them to accept low-paying jobs. As early as 1988, OWWA already 
implemented a self-employment program called Re-entry Program for Returning OCWs through 
Entrepreneurship Mediation (OWWA-REPROEM). It was expanded in September 1990 with the 
introduction of the Integrated Return Program for OCWs (IRPO). This new program included the 
following multi-level livelihood projects financing schemes for OWWA beneficiaries13: 
Non-Collateral Loan Windows. This is available to projects Which require an additional 
capital of PS,000 and below, and to group loans (of not more than 10 beneficiaries) with a 
maximum ceiling of P50.000. 
Micro-Enterprise Financing. This is open to all individual projects which require an 
additional capital of over P500 up to P15.000, and where total project cost does not exceed 
P50.000. 
Small Enterprise Financing. This is available to individual or group projects which require 
additional capital of over P5,000 up to P50,000, and whose total project cosr does not exceed PI 
million. Group loan has a maximum membership of 10 and ceiling of P500,000. 
Impact Projects Financing. This is open to individual or group projects that meet any or 
both of the following criteria: a) the project has the potential to launch small ventures out of the 
original project; and/or b) the project potentially has a significant impact on the community in 
terms of employment generation and of fostering self-reliance among project participants. 
The OWWA Board allocated P20.5 million to IRPO. There is no information yet on the 
extent of availment of this assistance. All these lending programs have beep continued after the 
Gulf crisis. 
During the height of the Gulf crisis, the government set up communication facilities, one at 
the Office of the President and another one at the OWWA office, to enable Filipinos to contact by 
telephone their relatives who were working in the Middle East The costs were borne entirely by 
these offices. This was terminated when the Gulf crisis ended. 
Table 7 shows a summary of the expenses/losses incurred by the government related to the 
Gulf Crisis. The total expenses/losses amounted to PI 83.3 million. However, P27.6 million 
could still be recouped by the government since these are in the form of loans. Mobilization and 
operational expenses indicated in item A> include the expenses incurred by OWWA to defray the 
cost of telephone overseas calls by Filipinos to their relatives in the Middle East but do not 
include those incurred by the Office of the President14. The total figure does not include the cost 
contributed by international agencies in repatriating OCWs to the Philippines. 
13. These were drawn from Paragua (1990). 
14. This information could not be obtained from the Office of the President. 
Table 16 
Summary of Expenses/Losses Incurred Related to the Gulf Crisis 
as of August 31,1991 
ACTIVITIES AMOUNT IN PESOS 
2 / 
A. Mobilization and Operational 
Expenses 
B. Airfare of Filipino Evacuees 
1. Philippine Airlines 
2. Other Airlines 
1/ 
C. Foreign Currencies Exchange 
D. Emergency Family Assistance Loan 
3/ 
E. Special Family Assistance Loan 
F. Equipment Outlay (Office) 
1. Kuwait 
2. Iraq 
G. Personal Claims 
1. Alejandro Santos 
H. Third quarter 1990 Allowance of 
Welfare officer Abdutatip Maldisa 
which was transmitted in his bank 
account in Kuwait 
4/ 
Opportunity lost of amount involved 
Re: Exposures to the Gulf Crisis 
TOTAL 
90,784,919.25 
9,298,413.75 
18,066,080.10 
100,083,333.00 
518,940.16 
25,597,440.00 
2,000,000.00 
631,843.00 
310,540.44 
315,672.00 
139,167.84 
35,636,389.98 
183,299,411.52 
Notes: 1/ Conversion of foreign currencies particularly Iraqi / Kuwaiti 
dinars and Saudi riyals brought home by evacuees. 
2/ Loan to workers evacuating from Kuwait and Iraq. 
3/ Loan to families of Filipino overseas workers who are still 
in Kuwait and Iraq. 
4/ Interest income foregone due to withdrawal of funds to finance items A to H. 
Source: Overseas Workers' Welfare Administration (0WWA), September 1991. 
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B. Smoothing Price Adjustment 
As discussed in Section II, the government has a plan to deregulate the oil industry that would 
involve the removal of the OPSF and the discontinuance of the forward foreign exchange cover 
for the oil companies. In view of the sharp rise in the price of crude oil following the Iraq-Kuwait 
conflict and of the increasing volatility of the oil price issue, the government deferred the planned 
deregulation of the oil industry. Thus, the OPSF and the forward foreign exchange cover were 
continued. 
Despite the rise in world prices of crude oil and the rapidly deteriorating value of the peso, 
the government tried to maintain the domestic prices of petroleum products for almost two 
months after the outbreak of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict (Chart 3). This was made possible by 
building up more deficits in the OPSF. As early as December 1989, unpaid claims of the three oil 
companies already amounted to P7.2 billion. This increased by another P3.5 billion during the 
first half of 1990. Congress appropriated in 1990 P5 billion to partly cover the unpaid claims in 
1989, but it still left behind a big chunk of unpaid claims. 
The ERB finally adjusted the prices of petroleum products on 21 September 1990 by an 
average of P1.42 per liter. None of this adjustment was apportioned as additional direct oil 
company recovery. Instead, all this was used to augment the OPSF as a means of ensuring the oil 
companies' capacity to continue bringing in the crude oil requirements of the country15. But this 
price adjustment was soon found to be insufficient since the price of crude oil continued to climb 
and the value of peso weakened further. In particular, crude import costs increased to an average 
of US$26,705 per barrel during the period September-October 1990 from the July-August 1990 
level of US$16.22 per barrel. The exchange rate deteriorated to P25.55 from P24 per US$1. This 
means a landed cost of P882.36 per barrel for the period September-October 1990 compared to 
P483.38 per barrel for July-August 199016. 
This new development caused further deterioration of the OPSF. Thus, another round of 
petroleum price adjustment was made on 5 December 1991. The adjustment this time was much 
sharper than the previous ones. Prices were increased by an average of P2.82 per liter, but the 
adjustment was made uneven among different types of petroleum products. For instance, the 
price of premium gasoline was increased by 80 percent to PI5.95 per liter, while the price of 
LPG was increased by 57 percent to P6.89 per liter. Strong pressure from various sectors, 
including the executive and legislative branches, to give some relief to users of diesel oil, 
kerosene, and LPG compelled the ERB a few days later to revise downward the retail prices of 
these products. Likewise, the price of fuel oil, because of its wide application and linkages, was 
adjusted downward to reduce its potential impact on inflation. As shown in Table 8, almost all of 
the increase in the prices of petroleum products will go to the OPSF. The historical and present 
price structure of selected petroleum products is shown in Table 9. The prices of petroleum 
products were reduced by an average of PI.17 per liter Jn the first week of August 1991, 
approximately six months after the world prices of crude oil softened. 
Another measure legislated in September 1990 was the conversion of the ad valorem tax on 
oil products into specific tax (Table 10). This was originally part of the 1990 Tax Reform 
15. ERB Order dated 21 September 1990. 
16. ERB Order dated 5 December 1990. 
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Table 16 (continued) 
Distribution of the Total Increase in the Prices of Petroleum Products, 
Metro Manila (In pesos per liter) 
Premium 
Regular 
Avturbo 
Kerosene 
Diesel Oil 
Fuel Oil 
LPG 
Asphalts 
Thinners 
OPSF Tranship- Dealer's Hauling 
ment Mark-up Charge Total 
6.9600 0.005 0.10 0.015 7.0800 6.3900 0.005 0.09 0.015 6.5000 4.9900 0.005 5.0000 3.0100 0.005 0.08 0.015 3.1100 3.0100 0.005 0.08 0.015 3.1100 0.0625 0.005 0.0675 2.5000 0.005 0.10 0.015 2.6200 2.5000 0.005 2.5050 2.5000 0.005 2.5050 
2.8143 0.005 0.058 0.010 2.8873 Average 
Note: Total price changes vary across regions because of different transport costs. 
Source: Energy Regulatory Board. 
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Table 9 
Historical Prices of Selected Petroleum Products (In pesos per liter) 
Date Effective 
RETAIL PRICES 
Premium 
Gasoline 
Regular 
Gasoline 
Kero-
sene 
Diesel LPG 
WHOLESALE POSTED PRICE 
Avturbo Fuel 
Oils 
Sol- Asphalts 
vents 
18 May 1984 6.8900 6.6900 4.8900 4.8900 4.6580 6.2940 3.6640 S.8160 
7 Jun 1984 8.2800 8.0300 6.2100 6.2000 5.8410 7.7240 4.6450 7,1860 
20 Oct 1984 9.2400 8.8100 7.1700 7.2600 6.4840 9.0490 5.2870 8.6646 
9 Jan 1985 9.0100 8.5800 6.9500 7.0400 6.2700 8.8240 5.0240 8.4400 
7 Mar 1985 8.4000 8.0300 6.3400 6.4200 5.8460 7.5770 4.6670 7.8300 
25 Jan 1986 7.4000 7.0300 5.7600 5.7200 5.2640 7.5770 4.1220 7.1920 
20 Mar 1986 7.1500 6.7800 5.3100 5.2600 4.6640 7.0840 3.4720 6.7000 
22 Nay 1986 6.9000 6.5300 4.8100 4.7600 4.1640 6.5840 2.8150 6.4500 
1 Aug 1986 6.9000 6.5300 4.8100 4.7600 4.1640 6.5840 2.5030 6.4500 
15 Oct 1986 6.9000 6.5300 4.8100 4.7600 4.1640 6.5900 2.5045 6.4598 
15 Aug 1987 8.2000 7.8500 5.6900 5.6400 4.5960 7.34 DO 2.8225 7.6178 
26 Aug 1987 7.5000 7.1500 5.3000 5.2500 4.3831 7.3400 2.8225 7.6178 
1 Sep 1987 7.5000 7.1500 5.3000 5.2500 4.3831 7.3438 2.8225 7.6178 
1 Jan 1988 7.5000 7.1500 5.3000 5.2500 4.3831 7.3400 2.8225 7.6178 
1 Mar 1988 7.5000 7.1500 5.3000 5.2500 4.2864 7.3400 2.8225 7.6178 
3 May 1988 7.0000 6.6500 5.0000 5.0000 4.2864 7.3400 2.8225 7.6178 
18 Aug 1988 6.8000 6.4300 4.7000 4.7000 3.5600 7.3438 2.8225 7.6178 
8 Nov 1988 5.8000 5.4300 3.7000 3.7000 3.6284 6.3438 2.3225 7.1178 
1 Jan 1989 5.8000 5.4300 3.7000 3.7000 2.8374 6.3438 2.3225 7.1178 
16 Aug 1989 5.8000 5.4300 3.7000 3.7000 2.8374 7.3438 2.8225 7.6178 
30 Nov 1989 7.0600 6.6900 4.9600 4.9600 3.5374 8.5238 3.4225 8.7978 
21 Sep 1990 8.8700 8.5000 6.2400 6.2400 4.3861 10.3900 4.9100 10.5099 
5 Dec 1990 15.9500 15.0000 9.3500 9.3500 6.8911 15.3902 4.9800 13.0149 
10 Dec 1990 15.9500 15.0000 7.7500 7.7500 5.6111 15.3902 5.1580 13.0149 
14 Aug 1991 12.7000 12.0000 7.3000 7.3000 5.2551 13.3902 3.8580 13.0149 
20 Dec 1991 12.0000 11.5000 7.3000 7.3000 5.2551 13.3902 3.4480 13.0149 
4.1570 
5.1680 
5.5723 
5.3580 
5.1680 
4.5870 
4.1370 
3.6370 
3.6370 
3.6468 
4.8438 
4.8438 
4.8438 
4.8438 
4.8438 
4.8438 
4.8438 
4.3438 
4.3438 
4.8438 
6.0238 
8.7398 
11.2448 
11.2448 
9.2448 
9.2448 
Source: Demand Management Division, Office of Energy Affairs. 
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Table 10 
Taxes and Duties on Petroleum Products 
Product 
Existing 
Ad Valorem 
Peso/Liter 
Tax Rate 
New Specific 
Peso/Liter 
Tax Rate 
% Reduction 
in Tax 
Premium 3.5963 2.5200 30 Regular 3.2622 2.2800 30 Jet 3.4037 2.3800 30 Diesel 1.1532 0.4500 60 Kerosene 1.1704 0.5000 57 LPG 1.0590 0 .0000 -Asphalt 0.7956 0.5600 21 Thinner 1.1780 0 .0000 -Fuel Oil 0 .0000 0 .0000 — 
Total 1.1363 0.6195 • -
Duty 0.4271 0.4271 -
Total 1.5634 1.0466 
Source: Office of Energy Affairs. 
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package, but it was the only one passed by Congress to help moderate the rise in prices of 
petroleum products. This conversion accomplished two things: (1) it reduced the effective tax 
rate on petroleum products, and (2) it made the excise tax on petroleum products less buoyant 
The first was a direct response to the public clamor for the government not to increase petroleum 
product prices despite the huge deficit buildup in the OPSF. Note that the shift from ad valorem 
to specific tax reduced the effective tax rate on gasoline and jet fuel from 92 percent of direct 
company take to 55 percent. The effective tax rate on kerosene and diesel dropped from 32 
percent to 11 percent, while that on LPG declined from 32 percent to zero. On the other hand, 
the second accomplishment may be viewed as a way to help minimize upward adjustments in 
domestic petroleum prices in line with the expected rise in world crude oil prices following the 
Gulf crisis. 
C. Foreign Exchange Arrangements 
The Central Bank allows the exchange rate to be determined in the foreign exchange market. 
Purchase and sale of foreign exchange are conducted freely at the Foreign Exchange Trading 
Center of the Bankers Association of the Philippines (BAP). The Central Bank may buy or sell 
foreign exchange in the BAP trading floor. From August to December 1990, the Central Bank 
was a net seller of foreign currency. This reflects the Central Bank's effort to stem speculation 
and stabilize the exchange rate during the Gulf crisis. Despite this effort, pressure on the peso 
had mounted due to the country's rapidly deteriorating trade balance. The peso-dollar exchange 
rate as quoted in the BAP trading floor moved by 19 percent to P28 per US$1 between July and 
November 1990. This rate remained until 8 April 1991 when it started to improve. 
Apart from being a net seller of foreign exchange during the Gulf crisis, the Central Bank 
modified exchange arrangements to relieve pressure on the domestic currency and improve the 
country's external position. In September 1990, the Central Bank issued Circular No. 1251 
restricting commercial banks' margin on purchase or sale of foreign exchange on "spot 
transactions" to the following: minimum buying rate-not less than 1 percent below the BAP 
reference rate; maximum selling rate-not more than 2 percent above the BAP reference rate . 
For deals other than spot, or those categorized as "forward transactions," the minimum buying 
rate should not be less than 1 percent below spot rates, and the maximum selling rate should not 
be more than 1 percent above spot rates18. All forward sales by banks should only be for debt 
service, trade related, or for other purposes authorized by the Central Bank. In the same circular, 
the Central Bank also ordered the banks not to collect any additional commissions or charges 
other than the actual telegraphic or cable costs. This circular was lifted on 25 January 1991. But 
another circular regulating the foreign exchange position of commercial banks was issued at 
about the time Circular No. 1251 was lifted. 
Circular No. 1272, dated 28 January 1991, puts some restrictions on the allowable 
overbought position of commercial banks to prevent them from hoarding foreign exchange for 
speculation purposes. In particular, foreign exchange assets of banks may exceed their foreign 
exchange liabilities provided that the excess does not go beyond the average of their negotiated 
letters of credit for the immediate past three months (Annex A for details). Any positive balance 
17. "Spot transactions" are those that are transacted on the BAP trading floor which should be settled within two business 
days from transaction date. 
18. "Forward transactions" are those lhat do not pass through the BAP trading floor, or those that are done individually 
among banks. • -
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must be sold daily. The BAP found this new regulation too tight and lobbied for its relaxation. 
Also, the definitions of specific asset and liability items to be included in the computation were 
not clear. Each bank, therefore, came up with their own definitions. Thus, on 22 February 1991, 
the Central Bank issued the revised^ Circular 1274 to Alax a bit the measure and provide more 
specific definitions of foreign exchange assets and liabilities to be included in the computation. 
Under the revised circular, the banks' foreign exchange assets may exceed their foreign exchange 
liabilities but not their average monthly payments for merchandise imports and invisibles. 
Allowable retentions are computed based on the average monthly transactions for the preceding 
12 months. This was further revised on 4 March 1991 (Circular No. 1276) to alter the definitions 
of foreign exchange assets and liabilities to be included in the computation. The last amendment 
to this circular was issued on 20 April 1991 specifying a bank's allowable overbought and 
oversold position (Circular 1283). 
The BAP tried to help the government rationalize the allocation of limited foreign exchange 
by instituting the so- called "oil pit" and the "voluntary restraint program on importations." In 
August 1990, the BAP started to conduct a separate auction for the oil companies. Under this 
arrangement, the oil companies were required to inform the BAP in advance of their foreign 
exchange requirements. The BAP initially committed to allocate to the oil pit $150 million, or 15 
percent of the banks- net foreign exchange receipts, whichever was higher. Because of the huge 
gap between the foreign exchange supply in the "oil pit" and the requirements of the oil 
companies, the BAP in November 1990 increased its allocation to $180 million, or 20 percent of 
the banks' net receipts. Any excess was still provided by the banks in the "oil pit" with the 
assurance that the Central Bank woqld sell to the banks the corresponding amount in the next 
trading session. Althoiigh the "oil pit" was a program of the BAP, the Central Bank helped the 
BAP monitor the compliance of member banks since it has been monitoring the foreign exchange 
receipts and sales of banks on a daily basis. The BAP meted penalty to any violators. 
Regarding the voluntary restraint program on importations, the BAP urged its members to 
restrict the opening of letters of credit for non-oil imports to 80 percent of the average of foreign 
exchange receipts in the first seven months of 1990. This in effect limited the opening of trade 
credits by banks to about $455 million per month. The BAP drew up a system of priority, giving 
high priority to exporters and prince clients. 
The "oil pit" stirred some controversy in the banking community. SSmall banks, which before 
could not compete with big banks in securing-accounts with oil companies, were being forced to 
service the foreign; •exchange requirements of the oil firms at a much lower-income margin than 
they would have realized if the same amount of foreign exchange were used to service non-oil 
imports. In fact some small banks violated thte regulations on the oil pit and were penalized by 
the BAP. 
The "oil pit" and the voluntary restraint program on importations produced a multi-exchange 
rate system that was. more costly to non-oil importers. The three oil companies obtained their 
foreign exchange requirements at the BAP reference rate, while non-oil importers acquired theirs 
at a rate even higher than the biapk market rate. For instance, an importer wanting to import $1 
worth of goods had to buy US$1.25 at P32 to a dollar in the black market and turn it over to the 
bank to open a letter of credit worth US$1. He later withdrew the US$0.25 in pesos at P28 to a 
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dollar, which was the prevailing BAP reference rate. Thus, his effective rate turned out to be P33 
to a dollar. It was not surprising, therefore, to see prices of products with import contents 
increase more than the increase in the prices of petroleum products. 
On 19 February 1991, the BAP suspended its voluntary restraint program on importations in 
view of the improvement in the availability of foreign exchange, although it still enjoined 
members to follow the system of priorities it had earlier drawn up on the utilization of foreign 
exchange. As of 12 April 1991, the "oil pit" has practically become inoperative because foreign 
exchange supply has eased up. 
D. Energy Conservation Measures 
Aside from the measures discussed above, the government also adopted energy conservation 
measures to deal with the impending energy crisis. First, the President, through Administrative 
Order No. 191 dated 13 August 1990, created the Contingency Planning Committee with the 
Secretary of Economic Planning as head. The Committee was primarily responsible for 
formulating contingency plans and guidelines for the sectoral responses to the oil supply 
situation. The first complete plan was presented to and adopted in a joint meeting of the Cabinet, 
CORDS, and Regional Development Council chairmen on 22 August 1990. Many of the 
measures included in the plan were implemented, as may be gathered from the executive and 
administrative orders issued by the President, as well as from memorandum circulars of 
concerned government agencies since August 1990. 
On 13 August 1990, the President issued Executive Order No. 418 directing the immediate 
implementation of energy conservation measures. These include reducing the electricity and fuel 
consumption of all government units by 10 percent and 5 percent, respectively. This was later 
increased to 15 percent and 10 percent, respectively, under Executive Order No. 433 dated 2 
November 1990. The same executive order mandated the OEA to continue to require industrial, 
commercial, and transport establishments with annual energy consumption equivalent to more 
than one million liters of fuel oil, including liquid fuels and electricity, to submit an energy 
conservation program that would reduce their fuel and electricity consumption by 10 percent and 
15 percent, respectively. 
The President issued on 11 September 1990 Executive Order No. 422 activating and 
reorganizing the Energy Operations Board as the administrative machinery for the efficient and 
equitable allocation and distribution of energy. The Board included two representatives from the 
private sector. It was given the responsibility to formulate policies, guidelines, and rules and 
regulations for the allocation and distribution of energy/petroleum products to consumers and for 
developing an overall plan of action to implement the allocation and distribution system, 
including such rationing schemes as may be necessary. The first memorandum circular issued by 
the Board directed a 10 percent reduction in the sales and deliveries of petroleum products to 
petroleum fuels resellers, distributors, or individuals who directly withdraw their petroleum 
product requirements from the oil companies' depots, bulk plants, and other storage and 
distribution facilities. The Board also issued another memorandum circular on 15 January 1991 
adopting the odd-even scheme in the purchase of fuel in retail outlets. Private and public 
vehicles were allowed to buy petroleum fuels in gasoline stations only on certain days, depending 
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on the last digit of their plates. This was in preparation for an orderly rationing scheme in case of 
acute shortage of supply of petroleum products. 
Since it was felt that a shooting war in the Middle East was inevitable and could worsen the 
oil supply condition in the country, the Contingency Planning Committee modified its plan to 
include some worst-case scenario. Annex B shows the detailed plan assuming two scenarios, i.e., 
Scenario X for base or "now" scenario, and Scenario Y for a shooting war in the Middle East or 
oil supply cutoff which may vary in degrees of severity. The annex indicates the government 
agencies assigned to implement each measure. 
The contingency and energy conservation measures appeared to be less effective. 
Implementation was half-heartedly done partly due to lack of or unclear guidelines and partly due 
to poor organization. The information drive about new energy conservation measures was not as 
massive as one would have expected given severity of the crisis at hand. For instance, there was 
confusion regarding the execution of the odd-even scheme for the purchase of gasoline. There 
was no system being set up to monitor the 10 percent reduction in the sales and deliveries of 
petroleum products to petroleum fuels resellers, distributors, or individuals directly withdrawing 
their petroleum product requirements from oil companies' depots, bulk plants and other storage 
and distribution facilities. Practically all the contingency measures have already been withdrawn 
by the government after the Gulf crisis. 
E. Price and Wage Policies 
To prevent unreasonable increases in prices of certain prime commodities as a result of 
adjustments in the domestic prices of petroleum and of the rise in the peso-to-dollar exchange 
rate, and to protect the people from hoarding, profiteering, injurious speculations, manipulation 
of prices and other such activities, the President issued on 4 October 1990 Executive Order No. 
423 imposing price ceilings on seven prime and essential commodities, namely, rice, milk, sugar, 
pork, hard flour, chicken, and cooking oil (Table 11). The price monitoring unit of the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) closely watched the price movements of these 
commodities and sent to jail those found violating the order. The price ceilings of milk, sugar, 
pork, chicken and cooking oil were revised upward on 10 January 1991 to allow suppliers to 
improve their margin. On 30 April 1991, price ceilings on all commodities mentioned above had 
been removed because supply and prices of those commodities have already normalized and 
stabilized 
Under Republic Act No. 6727 (1989), the wage board created for each of the twelve regions 
of the country is supposed to determine increases in the minimum wages. The National Capital 
Region (Metro Manila) had already issued four wage orders since the outbreak of the 
Iraq-Kuwait conflict. Wage Order No. 1 increased the statutory daily minimum wage from P89 
to P106 effective 1 November 1990. Wage Order No. 1-A extended the P17 daily pay increase to 
those workers already receiving wages above the statutory minimum wage up to PI 25 per day 
effective 10 November 1990. Wage Order No. 2 provisionally increased the statutory daily 
minimum wage from P106 to PI 18. It also extended the P12 daily pay increase to those 
receiving above the statutory minimum wage up to P142 per day. These provisional increases 
were supposed to have become effective on 24 December 1990, but Wage Order No. 2-A moved 
this effectivity date to 6 January 1991. 
19. Executive Order No. 456, dated 30 April 1991. 
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Table 11 
Price Ceilings on Seven Prime and Essential Commodities 
COMMODITY PRICE CEILING 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
RICE 
Miller to Wholesaler 
Wholesaler to Retailer 
Retailer to Consumer 
Well Milled 
P465/bag 
or 
P9.30/kl 
P475/bag 
or 
P 9 . 5 0 / k l 
P500/bag 
or 
PlO.OO/kl 
Regular Milled 
P445/bag 
or 
P8.90/kl 
P455/bag 
or 
P9.10/kl 
P475/bag 
or 
P9.50/kl 
NFA 
MILK 
Sweetened Filled (300 ml) 
Evap Filled (370 ml) 
Powdered Filled (180 gm) 
Powdered Filled (200 gm) 
SUGAR 
.Refined (inclusive of 10% VAT) 
Brown (VAT-exempt) 
PORK LIEMPO WITH SKIN 
HARD FLOUR (25 kg. bag) 
CHICKEN (FULLY DRESSED) 
COOKING OIL (SINGLE REFINED) 
Lapad (354 grams) 
Long Neck (708 grams) 
P14.60/can 
11.85/can 
15.70/can 
17.50/can 
P15.90/kl 
11.80/kl 
P56.00/kl 
P270.00 
P55.00/kl 
P4.20 
P8.40 
P7.50/kl 
Note; The prices of kerosene and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) 
shall be those set by the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB). 
Source: Executive Order No.423, 4 October 1990. 
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F. Fiscal Measures and Monetary Policy 
With the contraction of the economy during the second half of 1990, the government 
expected the budget deficit to deteriorate further. To reduce this deficit, the President mandated 
under Administrative Order No. 197 dated 8 October 1990 a 20 percent budgetary cut on the 
maintenance and other operating expenses of the national government for the fourth quarter of 
Fiscal Year 1990. This was followed by Administrative Order No. 205 dated 3 January 1991 
directing the continued adoption of economy measures for Fiscal Year 1991. The measures 
included a 5 percent initial reduction of government employees by the end of June and another 5 
percent by December through voluntary retirement and redeployment, and the sale of government 
vehicles to present users with the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, and 
Directors. These economy measures have been maintained even after the Gulf crisis in view of 
the revenue shortfall the government will experience for the rest of 1991. In particular, the 
directive to reduce government staff has been strictly enforced and continued even after the Gulf 
crisis. All government agencies had to submit to the Department of Budget and Management a 
report regarding their compliance of such. However, the directive to sell government vehicles to 
present users has not yet been implemented. With a severe cut in the take-home pay as a result of 
the salary standardization law and the ruling of the Supreme Court disallowing government 
officials with the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, and Assistant Secretary to receive additional 
compensation for performing additional tasks, such as member of the Board of Directors of a 
government-owned corporation, this directive will unlikely be implemented in the future. 
One government measure which met strong resistance from the private sector is the 9 percent 
import levy imposed in January 1991. It is a temporary revenue-raising measure which will be 
phased out as soon as Congress approves new tax revenue measures. At the moment, however, 
Congress is still reluctant to pass such measures since it believes that raising revenues is only a 
matter of improving tax collection. The government reduced the import levy to 5 percent in 
August 1991. The revenue raised through the levy had been lower than expected because of the 
sharp drop in imports. 
During the second half of 1990, the Central Bank tried to contain the growth of monetary 
aggregates. The 12-month broad money growth accelerated to 27.2 percent in September 1990. 
To abate this growth, the Central Bank reintroduced its own short-term securities called the CB 
bills on 19 September to complement its use of reverse repurchase agreements in the conduct of 
open market operations. The Central Bank temporarily suspended the issuance of the CB bills on 
8 October 1990, but resumed it on 28 January 1991. The open market operation of the Central 
Bank was accompanied by successive increases in the reserve requirement for the banks' deposit 
liabilities from 21 percent on 26 March 1990 to 22 percent on 15 November 1990, 23 percent on 
30 November 1990, and 25 percent on 28 December 1990. All these measures helped in keeping 
the reserve money closer to their levels. The 25 percent reserve requirement has been maintained 
up to the present time. 
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IV. IMPACT OF THE GULF CRISIS ON THE BUDGET, BALANCE-OF-
PAYMENTS AND EMPLOYMENT 
This section discusses the impact of the Gulf crisis on the government budget, balance of 
payments, and employment It is quite difficult to sort out such impact from those of other 
factors since the economy was already heading toward a crisis even before the outbreak of the 
Iraq-Kuwait conflict The Gulf crisis only compounded the problems. 
The subsequent discussions will focus only on those effects that can be traced directly to the 
Gulf crisis and/or to those that arise from the government's responses to such crisis. 
A. Government Budget Deficit 
To a large extent, the impact of the Gulf crisis on the budget deficit depended on the 
government's response measures to the crisis. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the 
government delayed the price adjustments of domestic petroleum products, resulting in huge 
accumulation of OPSF deficit from P7.1 billion in January 1990 to P15.5 billion in December 
(Table 12). Between September and November alone, the OPSF deficit increased by over P2.5 
billion per month. The deficit increase was arrested only in December when domestic prices of 
petroleum products were adjusted upward to reflect market conditions. 
The impact of the OPSF deficit on the consolidated public sector deficit is shown in Table 13. 
This deficit increased from 3 percent of GNP in 1988 to 4.3 percent in 1989, and to 5.2 percent in 
1990. This was largely due to the OPSF deficit, which was 0.9 percent of GNP in 1989 and 0.7 
percent in 1990. Despite the decline in world prices of crude oil after the Gulf war, the ERB has 
decided to delay the roll back of the domestic prices of petroleum products until the OPSF deficit 
is completely wiped out and a comfortable surplus is achieved. This objective will be met by 
October 1991. 
Another measure which had a direct bearing on the government deficit was the shift from ad 
valorem tax to specific tax on petroleum products. This was planned during the early part of 
1990 but its implementation was hastened with the onset of the Gulf crisis. The original proposal 
submitted by the administration was supposed to be revenue-neutral. However, to minimize 
increases in prices of petroleum products, Congress passed a bill, subsequently approved by the 
President, that effectively cut the tax on petroleum products by close to 50 percent. The revenue 
implication of this move was clear, but the exact magnitude was not The government conceded 
that it lost about P1.5 billion in revenues in 1990. For 1991, the expected loss is P8 billion. Our 
own estimate shows that the government will lose P43.5 billion in 1991 (Table 14) . This 
estimate is based on the actual volume of consumption in 1990, direct company take as of 1 
January 1991, ad valorem rates prior to the 5 October 1990 directive, and existing specific tax 
rates. This estimate differs markedly from the official government estimate of P8 billion; the 
latter was based on direct company take for October 1990, which was lower than the January 
1991 data. 
It is not clear whether the shift from ad valorem to specific tax has indeed kept the inflation 
rate lower than what it would have been otherwise, or whether it has made the tax system more 
equitable. The reason is that the revenue shortfall arising from this shift in policy is financed 
largely by inflation tax. 
20. This was calculated by Dr. Rosario G. Manasan for the study. 
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Table 13 
Consolidated Public Sector Deficit, 1988 -1992 
1988 1989 1990 1991" 1992" 
(In billionB o f pesos) 
National Government deficit -23. 2 -19.6 -40.0 -26.4" -9.0 
Monitored corporations deficit 2. 1 -4.4 -12.5 -16.1" -15.4 
OPSF deficit-' - -7.4 12.3 W -2.5 
Adjustments for intra-PSBR transfers- 3. 9 2.8 12.6 15.8" 5.0 
Monitored Public Sector - — — 
Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) -17. 2 -21.2 -47.3 -14.4 -21.9 
OPSF deficit- -9.0 _ 
Surplus of Government Financial 
Institutions-' 2. 1 3.3 1.4 -1.1" 3.2 
Net income of the Central Bank*' -16. 9 -20.8 -22.2 -22.3 -28.6 
others^' 5. 6 4.2 8.8 7.7" 9.5 
Adjustments for other transfers 
within the public sector- 1. 4 2.5 0.8 -0.1" 0.0 
Consolidated Public 
Sector Deficit (CPSD) -25. 0 -41.0 -58.5 -30.2 -37.7 
Memorandum Items: 
Financing of the PSBR 17. 2 21.2 47.3 
Net External 0. 6 8.8 8.3 
Net Domestic 16. 6 12.4 39.0 
(in percent of GNP) 
National Government Deficit -2. 8 -2.0 -3.6 -2.1 -0.6 
of which: Primary Balance 2. 7 3.7 2.8 
Monitored corporations' deficit 0. 3 -0.5 -1.1 -1.3 -1.1 
PSBR -2. 1 -2.2 -4.2 -1.1 -1.6 
Consolidated Public Sector Deficit -3. 0 -4.3 -5.2 -2.4 -2.7 
^Consolidated with the PSBR beginning in 1990. 
^Includes adjustments for net lending for debt buybacks, National Government 
(NG) net lending and equity to monitored corporations, NG transfers to the OPSF, OPSF 
settlement of arrears included in the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) cash 
generation, and PNOC's share of the OPSF deficit. 
-'Philippine National Bank (PNB), Development Bank of the Philippines (OBP), the 
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation (Philguarantee), and the 
Land Bank. 
"Net of the impact of debt reduction, estimated at pi.9 billion in 1990, f2.1 
billion in 1991, and ?2.3 billion in 1992. 
-Includes the Local Government Units (LGUs) and the social security 
institutions. 
^Includes NG net lending and equity to GFIs and adjustments of OPSF deficits 
covered by PNOC before 1990. 
"'Latest Assessment for CY 1991 and Proposed Program for CY 1992. 
^Preliminary Actuals. 
"Full Year Estimates with January - September actuals. 
'"'Full Year Estimates with January - November actuals. 
Sources: Data provided by the Philippine authorities; and staff estimates. 
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Government measures to cut the budget deficit, such as the 20 percent cut on the maintenance 
and other operating expenses of the national government for the fourth quarter of 1990, were not 
enough to counter the impact of the large OPSF deficit and the revenue losses due to the 
reduction of tax rates on petroleum products. 
B. Balance-of-Payments 
The impact of the Gulf crisis on the balance of payments may be discerned in Table 15. 
Deficit in merchandise trade rose from US$2.6 billion in 1989 to US$4.0 billion in 1990. The 
squeeze came from both export and import. 
The poor export performance in 1990 was due to a combination of the following: (1) weak 
demand for manufactured products (notably garments and electronic goods) and traditional 
exports (i.e., coconut, copper, and fish products), and (2) supply bottlenecks encountered by 
manufactured and traditional exports as a result of drought, power shortages, the July earthquake, 
and the devastating typhoon in November. The Gulf crisis seriously affected Philippine exports 
to Kuwait and the rest of the Middle East (Table 16). Exports to Kuwait between August and 
December were practically nil. This means that, based on exports to Kuwait for the comparable 
period in 1989, the Philippines lost about US$4 million in 1990. For the rest of the Middle East, 
exports did not decline but export growth rate came almost to a halt. Again, about US$4 million 
were lost here if the same export growth in 1989 was used as basis. 
Imports in 1990 increased by US$1,787 million over that of 1989, and 25.1 percent of it can 
be accounted for by the increase in oil bill. The surge in oil import bill was due to the increase in 
the price of crude oil and in the volume of crude oil imports as the government tried to encourage 
oil companies to increase their oil inventory level from 60 days to 90 days during the second half 
of the year. 
Although remittances of Filipino OCWs still managed to increase in 1990 by US$201 
million, total remittances from the Middle East fell by US$24 million (Table 17 for a more 
detailed information). Remittances of OCWs in the Middle East actually started to fall in July 
1990 by about 56 percent over the previous month. Aside from receiving virtually nothing from 
Kuwait and Iraq during the period August-December 1990, remittances from the rest of the 
Middle East also dropped in the same period. In particular, remittances in the last quarter of 1990 
were only more than half their levels compared to the same period in 1989. 
By comparing 1989 and 1990 remittances for the months of August to December, one can 
observe remittance losses due to the Gulf crisis amounting to at least US$31 million. Still, this is 
a conservative estimate since it is based on official Central Bank statistics. Many workers in the 
Middle East remit their earnings through informal channels, such as friends going home and 
informal courier system. NEDA estimates that loss in foreign exchange remittances from Iraq 
and Kuwait could go as high as US$82 million, and from Saudi Arabia to about US$100 million, 
based on an average monthly earnings per worker of US$316, US$360, and US$408 in Iraq, 
Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, respectively. 
The tourism industry was one of the sectors hardest hit by the Gulf crisis. The number of 
tourist arrivals already declined in the first half of 1990 due to the coup attempt that was staged in 
December 1989. Optimism rose in the early part of the second semester as the political 
I 
I 
£ 
Di 
3 r\j 
vfl CO >f O fV a 10 N N s O Oi O N. 
fO N »- i- i-
o <o 4 » 4 ni (M a a pi N O <- (NJ O >0 CO 
j io N i- sr 
CO ,— CM ro fM o 
m in 
$ K K 
(5 UJ 00 -f K. M o o ^ IM IM S S it 
co 
ro 
Sim in s 
ST CM ru ^  * * (M » * ' to - o 
4 <o o >- M» 
O- o o 
« a 4 O- <\J l\J 
KL S 4 
CO o 
in a T— Ol CO to <a CM •o o- CM CM O CO O 
It in It to to in o 
1 IM i rv o it 
0> W O IM CM IM CO tQ M t- IM CO CO 5 FA 
O J 
" s U1 N- CM O O O tM 4 IS r\j - -' CM st 
CO 
G S ro SJ  ;t CO RS o o I- o (S. CO 
o - <a ro © in in ^ •<* tO to Oi »- CM ^ IO CO CO Pi 
O^ s s 
o m it 
a m 4 to CO 
co sr (M 
E 5 3 
r" i Q 
'J' 
3 
tv O Cv » © ^ CM to IM in 
O N N (M «- in -o «- to 
CM st- to M IM o 4 in S N co to in in 3 3 8 •tf N ^ 
r^  s* ^ r^  Os o 
S 
sr in O 
w in j s m i-O 4 4 N f & 
W I O ( 0 N K • >» in ro 
in ^  ^ r- m t^ «* W st m N CM Oi © «-
Kl m o >- M CM in <o ^ 
CM O. «- <M CO CM r- © >f >fl «- vj i ir> 3 (M G S S R N iO ro CM ro to ro 
lO m 00 o o o ro sr N S O. CO >— o-it Kl 
I % K N- CO 
I 
^ oi. I— >o to o i- i m 
co to <o O CM CM _ to CO >o -O i CM 
» 4 » « N •-in in <t q n lO -J- to to to 
>0 £ o 
I - O CM i- ^ in 
r\j r^- o o *— m o in 
o K 
CM 
N m S N o N 
CO O A o I R IM 
sr o sr w— N in N ni i ro | t £ K 8 E CO I T < 
© in in IM CM It 
E iO <o ro nj IM to *— in ro CM ro 11 CO CO 
CM co 
1 
>0 o IM 
•O S » vr t\j so Is 
0 0 * 0 0 
N in N IM 
o ro if CO o o> 
I - CM 
-3- IM iO <»• O iO CM IM IO © Oi 
N S « it Kl « (M in N IM i CM 
N 5P g> CM Ol CO . to CO CM IM OI CM o* N- N- IM ro CM T- in RS IM • CM 
•J ro o ts co in CM I T I T ro 
sr sr CM 
IM © CM CM iO sr © o O © CO o o CM in rs <o © -o to ro 
" CO < - CO* *— T— 
ro ro I* to a 
*— p iO ro LA © in <o CM CM i o> *— i as T— 
IV _ in CO o •a Q id ro sf Oi st ro to o ro CM 1 i CO © CO © " 
i / I z • 
u <£ CO 
<u 
3 
0) 
•O « o e 1- Ql O o oe r-„ 01 M 
j z cm f o o 
^ 1 JZ 
o 3 
IU 
01 
I— 72 C <- I - o O 3 <4-C. O O 
A I _ 
* e • c 
" S " 
X IA X o L. 3 0 01 O 4-t 10 4J 3 c C o 10 M O t_ h* 
a 
** 
o 
o o y « en 
* fi. c 
§ t a: a. 
3 u E 01 to 
CO i l 
(A H> 
S - 3 
i n u l O f M u l P J i - O 
ro r\i 
-o o o^ "O 
o eo o pg o> 
o -j- r- rsi m 
ro eo vr eo o • ro rg ru 
Ch (VI «- <0 S 1- lA 
(Nl S Q CO K O 
fO W S 01 O CM 
• r\j r\j < 
o c o o ^ o o r o o v r i n o r o r a r o ' - c o ^ «- i/> ro «- «— rg fM i 
N in rt o ^ 
(M i-
S (\l irt S S ^ 
B $ t E! 2 R 
(vi M •-
rj vO J 
o ro sj ro ro o* rj 
r\j m ro 
co ro ui N. st N-sr ifl co f o s i/i m ^ *— *— 
<- r\j 
t\j hi o 
ro N -j-
ro o N T— rj 
O N IN- -J-LA LA 
a . < o 
o z 
w <u > 
c 2 -E 3 ° 
a) 5. c 
3 
3 O 
O '-J 
CD C D HI C 3 
C — O I- — O 
O O 
K 
sf 
A 
CO 
.0 
r1 
C O O ^ N N O O " ' -
S i n c O f - r n N ^ ' O 
-J (M S «- f- U"» «— 
to r--
. «- co 
fM «— -O fO 8 
in co ro co N ^ K f\l o 
«— fM . ^ 
N O ^ 
CM CM r\j ro 
t— o 
CO O t-
co o 
fM 
t- IA O 
IE 
IN 
o 
U1 O* O (\J 
IO O O 
O s. 
NO 
o N ro 
O N 
e o 
•D 
c 
ro 
a ro o x> M- « 
o 0J o 
C -J 
O -J 
az — 
4-1 
c t/i 
E •5 
<U c 
0> CD 
<A c f 4-* O 
c "O (_ a* c 
1 
(0 < i 
<0 (A 01 
CL ^ 
(U 4) co "g t— 
o rt (D 
(D 
> (/> L. 0) QJ a) > M» > (A CO u £ di V C c_ (A u 
01 ro 4) E .c (_ co Q. 4—' (/) 
o (U 4) (D 
f (_ a (U 0) 
.c 4-f C 4-> o o £ c_ u o •J <11 c 4-r "O ro CD C 41 Q. 3 (A 
W) 4> u E C ac c (_ o 4-J O fM o Q. c 4-) 
CL (U CTJ E E 5 
C u D VI c 
(_ a . =3 o -C JZ E o 
a > 3 O TD liJ O u C ai L3 C/J rtJ •o _c 0) Ui c o C ro ro o > o 
E c: C c .— o o ai d) (/) i_ u (A 4-* M- •J <L) c <0 c. co QJ 
c z o E 2 CO w 
a> "D ro tfl t. u c co' 
•a *-> o > 
-C ^ C o -M cy) 
<Q 
(_ C « 
<1) (/] 
c £ 4J t_ c 
<0 ro o 
CD o c en 4-< 
CL < -o ^ ro ro ra c i. t_) c o o (D 
o 2 Q_ a 
E o Of <M O (0 M- 4> z O TJ O) (U C c 
E HI JZ; 4-1 </) CD ro o c a <u t_ (U (_ (/> o 
a 4-1 u 3 4-i s< 
a CO c O) ^  UJ 
c/i c o o 
o M- Q. C 
c •i— tD X O) 
3 O) LU 
O CL. <0 CJ (D <u 
u c 3 u c 
u (/) 4-> o o 
(0 £ t_ <u o 4-f (D JZ (0 >. 1ft L. L. <u >s 
QJ o O c a> t_ > 5 -Q 3 3 
L. 0) II) n> i_ c/j » 
<U >Ti H- ^ 
LTl > </) ro 3 
ro i (tJ o CD 0) co C L. 4-J o (A u C a» ro o a> c_ ro 3 ro c 
o 'E <_ ro JD C T3 o t_ ^ ro c a t— o a> £ c ro Q. z TJ c o c ro o LLI fM • Hi o c CJ j= E t-i <L> ro u 
i Q. ^ c o > - £ CO i i 3 ro u a> o (_) O. 
u C X CO 
"0 •i— o a> 4-1 S3- QJ 
o H- 1 ro H- c (/) fM JC d> H- V5 o 4) V 
^ C_) i <u t/1 4> ^  o o ro 
(Si V3 £ 4-* 0- <M M-
Q£ LL. I ro ra 4-J a; A> tf o 
<C UJ • > c 01 £X 4-J t/j 
LU Cl i in u o ro ^ 
« co o o •bJ co E c 
0£ c/l i O u (A c/) ro 
C ^ • (_ 4> ro CD wj 1 • o 4) Ol fSi (A 3 rsj 
LU Q_ t ro 4-> 4- C CO QJ 4-< QJ 
Oi t CO V5 ro ro O o O (A ro 
co 3 • o <1) C . C >. ro c 4J < (/I « 3 ro u L. ro i— i "0 L_ O) ro —i c t— _1 i' c •M (/) > • c c ro ro ro 41 i o "O 4-* L. n t— (_> 
4J > 
m QJ 
Ci CtL 
E 
4J C — J) .„ 
c o n 
O D L. 
E m a. 
<U 
-- "O ro 
D L. 
IT3 _Q O 
Table 16 
Philippine Exports to Iraq, Kuwait, Rest of Middle East and Rest of the 
World, 1988 - 1990 (FOB value in thousand US dollars) 
Value of Exports 
Year/Month Total Iraq Kuwait Rest of Rest of 
Middle the World 
East 
1988 
Total 7,074,191 1,309 6,703 93,863 6,972,316 
Jan 492,016 0 414 7,227 484,375 
Feb 526,609 0 373 7,606 518,630 
Mar 531,866 114 643 9,502 521,607 
Apr 534,475 107 717 6,686 526,965 
Hay 559,946 168 800 7,542 551,436 
Jun 618,598 202 603 8,469 609,324 
Jul 618,210 71 303 5,638 612,198 
Aug 639,988 118 750 5,905 633,215 
Sep 628,138 192 440 6,979 620,527 
Oct 592,570 311 314 8,529 583,416 
Nov 609,633 26 976 9,648 598,983 
Dec 723,142 0 370 10,132 711,640 
1989 
Total 7,820,713 35 8,936 114,474 7,697,268 
Jan 576,312 0 296 9,774 566,242 
Feb 565,528 0 470 8,741 556,317 
Mar 636,061 0 1,132 6,714 628,215 
Apr 647,396 34 1,431 9,920 636,011 
May 677,259 0 704 11,598 664,957 
Jun 659,325 0 354 9,081 649,890 
Jul 707,250 0 613 12,148 694,489 
Aug 665,348 0 583 7,394 657,371 
Sep 676,709 0 811 8,759 667,139 
Oct 676,242 1 537 10,118 665,586 
Nov 651,048 0 1,189 8.979 640,880 
Dec 682,235 0 816 11,248 670,171 
42 
Table 16 (continued) 
Value of Exports 
Year/Month Total Iraq Kuwait Rest of Rest of 
Middle the World 
East 
1990 
Total 8,186,024 2 5,508 123,119 8,057,395 
Jan 587,145 2 516 10,993 575,634 
Feb 652,042 0 917 8,570 642,555 
Mar 710,812 0 1,099 8,830 700,883 
Apr 623,823 0 1,044 9,894 612,885 
May 697,093 0 614 17,714 678,765 
Jun 642,140 0 706 8,542 632,892 
Jul 730,732 0 585 12,496 717,651 
Aug 680,139 0 27 7,583 672,529 
Sep 744,945 0 0 8,982 735,963 
Oct 696,703 0 0 11,369 685,334 
Nov 686,330 0 0 8,586 677,744 
Dec 734,120 0 0 9,560 724,560 
1991 
Total 8,839,000 0 3 148,997 8,690,000 
Jan 626,018 0 0 4,554 621,464 
Feb 661,072 0 0 4,395 656,677 
Mar 740,086 0 0 9,971 730,115 
Apr 698,178 0 0 10,820 687,358 
May 681,756 0 0 12,143 669,613 
Jun 761,597 0 0 14,735 746,862 
Jul 7B7.625 0 0 13,866 773,759 
Aug 740,017 0 0 11,041 728,976 
Sep 760,000 0 0 13,000 747,000 
Oct 747,000 0 0 19,000 728,000 
Nov 735,000 0 1 13,000 721,000 
Dec 900,651 0 2 22,472 879,176 
Source: Central Bank of the Philippines 
Source of basic data: National Statistics Office 
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atmosphere started to stabilize. But this was frustrated by the Gulf crisis. The number of tourist 
arrivals during the period August-December 1990 fell by 98,397 compared to that of the same 
period in 1989 (Table 18). It continued to drop during the period January-April 1991 by 85,535 
relative to the same period in 1990. Assuming that each tourist spends the same average amount 
of money in their stay in the Philippines as in 1990 (i.e., US$1,306,190,000/1,024,520 = 
US$1,274.93), then the Philippines could have lost a tqtal of US$234.5 million from the reduced 
tourist arrivals during the period August 1990 to April 1991. 
The structure of the freight rate for imports from and exports to the Middle East and East 
Mediterranean countries is shown in Table 19. The freight rate did not change at all during the 
Gulf crisis. HoWeVer, Gulf war emergency surcharges were temporarily imposed beginning on 
19 January 1991 (Table 20). All these surcharges were withdrawn on 7 March 1991. 
Also, marine insurance rates during the Gulf crisis did not change at all. However, the war 
rate of those shipments coming from/going to affected countries during the war was increased 
from the usual 0.0275 percent to 1.6975 percent21. 
Some recent improvements in the balance of payments have been observed. Imports of 
capital equipment, raw materials, and consumer goods increased by, only 0.40 percent in the first 
two months of 1991. This is attributed mainly to the 9 percent import levy. By end of April, 
Central Bank's gross international reserves had risen to US$2.9 billion, higher by 45 percent than 
the end-December 1990 level. They can finance about 2.2 months of imports of goods and 
services, using January to March 1991 data. The increase in reserves was largely due to fresh 
money from the IMF, deposit by the Philippine treasurer of the proceeds of Japan Eximbank's 
co-financing of the Financial Sector Adjustment Loan and of various project loans from the 
World Bank and ADB, net deposits under the Trade Facility, and purchase of US Treasury 
warrants and of primary and panned gold. 
Since the issuance of Circular No. 1272 in January 1991, the Central Bank has become a net 
buyer of foreign exchange in the BAP trading floor. In March and April, it bought a total of 
US$606 million from the banking system. The peso reference rate vis-a-vis the US dollar 
strengthened to P27.849 as of 27 April from P28 at end-December 1990. 
C. Employment 
As of March 1991, 29,585 OCWs had been repatriated. They came home without a job 
waiting for them. About 56 percent of the Gulf returnees were service workers who received 
salaries at least three times higher than those received by their local counterparts (Table 21). It 
was hard for them to accept low- paying jobs in the country. Engineers and construction workers 
had a long waiting time because the construction industry in the countiy was in slump. There 
was no information on the number of worker returnees who were re-employed in the domestic or 
foreign labor markets. 
The overall employment situation in the country is shown in Table 22. Employment situation 
data are available only on a quarterly basis. As shown, unemployment rate improved slightly in 
21. This is based on the letter to the authors by Vlademir Dizon, Assistant manager of FGU Insurance Corporation dated 19 
September 1991. 
Table 18 
Monthly Breakdown of Tourist Arrivals and Tourism Receipts, 1989-1991 
Month / Tourism Receipts 
Year Tourist Arrivals (In million USS) 
1989 1990 1991 1989 1990 1991 
M S * 
° ° 
a a n " " " 
JANUARY 98,130 89,907 97,585 119.24 104.87 106.98 
FEBRUARY 106,867 91,484 63,628 147.83 105.25 79.26 
MARCH 102,479 102,685 77,930 148.99 141.58 86.44 
APRIL 91,022 97,989 77,387 116.89 136.99 88.31 
MAY 94,060 86,160 81,306 107.37 117.52 106.57 
JUNE 94,434 78,877 71,497 106.03 103.12 120.24 
JULY 115,755 88,B43 72,549 133.25 125.21 103.39 
AUGUST 113,676 79,753 79,056 114.54 103.05 119.95 
SEPTEMBER 87,434 66,019 68,411 104.28 87.82 84.84 
OCTOBER 96,997 68,987 79,864 114.39 79.4 93.38 
NOVEMBER 101,577 76,071 89,461 110.87 79.27 120.19 
DECEMBER 87,288 97,745 112,691 141.79 122.11 171.75 
TOTAL 1,189,719 1,024,520 951,365 1,465.47 1,306.19 1,281.30 
Sources of Data: (1) "Visitor Sanpla Survey." Department of Tourism. 
(2) "A/D CARDS." Tourism Research and statistics 
Division; Offica of TouPtsm Development and 
Department of Tourism. 
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Table 16 
Distribution of Gulf Returnees by Skills and/or Position Held 
Skill/Position Held Ho. X 
1. Professional! technical and 
related, workers 2,467 10.25 
2. Administrative, executive and 
managerial workers 92 0.38 
3. Clerical and related workers 1,060 4.40 
4. Sales workers 850 3.53 
5. Service workers 13,438 53k. 83 
6. Agricultural, animal husbandry 
and forestry workers, fishermen 
and hunters 63 0.26 
7. Production and related workers, 
transport equipment operators 
and laborers 1,861 7.73 
8. Footuare and leather goods workers 1,786 7.42 
9. Rubber and plastic product makers 1,319 5.48 
10. Workers not classifiable by occupation 952 3.96 
11. Members of the armed forces 46 0.19 
12. •* Seamen 136 0 J 7 
TOTAL 24,070 100.00 
Source: Overseas Workers Welfare Administration 
54 
55 
October 1990, but deteriorated in January 1991. Underemployment rate consistently increased in 
October 1990 and January 1991, indicating the labor sector's increasing hardship during the Gulf 
crisis period. 
V. IMPACT OF THE GULF CRISIS ON THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY: 
A SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
Even before the Gulf crisis, fundamental problems have beset the structure of the global 
economic system. Historically, the Philippine economy has been vulnerable to external shocks. 
Not surprisingly, it is one of the economies most adversely affected by the Middle East conflict. 
A recent conference (Pauly 1991) pointed out that the global economic uncertainties will not 
be resolved with the end of hostilities in the Middle East Thus, the medium term economic 
outlook for the world, as for the Philippines, remains unclear. 
This section attempts to assess quantitatively the impact on the Philippine economy of 
specific external shocks, such as movements in world oil prices and economic growth of 
industrialized countries. Admittedly, these events are only a microcosm of the entire spectrum of 
international economic activity. More important issues should also concern the Philippines, such 
as the external debt overhang and the potential global credit crunch arising from worldwide 
savings-investments imbalances. These issues could and should be addressed in other studies. In 
this particular exercise, the conditions related to external variables other than the world oil price 
and the growth of industrialized countries are held constant. 
A. Application of the PIDS-NEDA Macroeconometric Model 
To have a firm grasp of the analysis, it is useful to utilize a model that can capture the 
interrelationships of macroeconomic variables involved. A readily available macroeconometric 
model is the one developed at the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS). One 
version of it is currently being used at NEDA for planning purposes. The latest version of the 
model is summarized in Constantino, Yap, dela Paz, and Butiong (1989). 
The model can easily accommodate the external shocks specified in the exercise. There is a 
variable for an index of imported fuel, which could be adjusted according to relevant 
specifications. There is no aggregate variable for industrialized country growth (from hereon 
referred to as IC growth), although the GNP of the United States and Japan figure prominently in 
the external sector. Growth of world trade is absent from the model, but since the US and Japan 
are the country's major trading partners the presence of growth variables for these countries 
would make the last variable redundant. 
A baseline scenario was constructed for 1991 and 1992. Since 1990 had already transpired 
there was no need to include this year in the analysis. The baseline scenario is similar to the 
forecasts contained in Yap (1990) and Reyes and Yap (1991), with modifications to account for 
the assumptions on the baseline fuel prices and industrialized country growth data. The specific 
assumptions for this exercise are shown in Table 23, The results of the simulations are presented 
below. 
Table 16 
Assumptions on External Variables 
1990 
Middle 
1991 
High Low 
1992 
AOB VARIABLES 
Oil Price (per barrel) $20 $25 $17 $21 
IC Growth 2.50 1.4 1.0 2.0 2.B 
Uorld Trade Growth 5.70 5.3 4.0 5.8 6.0 
PIDS-NEDA MODEL VARIABLES 
MP IF 889.17 950.14 1187.68 807.62 9*7.66 
GNPJAP (growth rate) 4.50 3.50 2.0 .4.0 3.70 
GNPUS (growth rate) 2.0 1.0 0.70 1.5 2.0 
Note: 
MP1F • Implicit dollar fuel price index 
GNPJAP - GNP of Japan 
GNPUS - GNP of US 
57 
B. Analysis of Results 
A summary of results for key variables is presented in Table 23. A more detailed table is 
presented in Annexes C. 1 to C.7. 
The data shown in Table 24 reveal the definite pattern followed by the different 
macroeconomic variables. Almost all real variables22 exhibit a declining growth rate for 1991 as 
one proceeds from low to high oil price scenario. This is true for the case where the oil price and 
the IC growth are adjusted simultaneously for consistency, and for the case where the IC growth 
is held constant. Thus, it. can be concluded that an. oil price increase has an unambiguous 
contractionary effect on output. 
This dampening effect on real activity can be traced to various channels. On the supply side, 
a higher oil price means higher production cost, and unless producers can pass this on as higher 
prices the net effect on, aggregate supply is negative. The higher oil import bill combined with a 
diminished ability to export leads to a crowding out of imports of raw materials and intermediate 
goods, which in turn would result in cutbacks in production levels. In the agriculture, sector, 
where ctedit plays a crucial role in the production of certain crops, the increase in price level 
would iroiitf a drop in the real value of loans. 
On ^ expenditure side, higher inflationary expectations apsing from the oil cost push factor 
would dampen consumption and investment spending. Higher inflation itself would reduce the 
real value of fixed government and private expenditures. One particular source of die decline in 
investment is the wowding out of importation of capital goods. 
Data in Table 24 indicate the rise of inflation in 1991 and the decline in the balance of 
payments. The remits also show that the. Philippine economy is more sensitive to IC growth than 
to movements in flte world oil price level. This may be due to the OPSF's ability to act as buffer 
against steep price increases in the world fuel maiket On the other hand, it would be quite 
difficult for the export sector to shift its products out of the current market, and it will certainly 
feel the full effects of any short- or medium-term recession in the economies of its major trading 
partners. The long-term solution, of course, is greater market diversification. 
The results for-1992 yield two distinct cases. In the first case, the real variable exhibits a 
declining growth rate pattern similar to 1991 as it proceeds from low to high oil price scenario23. 
This is true for two variables: Agriculture Value Added and Investment In the second case, the 
rest of the real variables reported in Table 24 follow an opposite pattern, i.e., the growth rate 
increases as one proceeds from low to high oil price scenario. 
One explanation for this trend is that a lower growth rate in 1991 would produce a lower 
base, thereby yielding a higher growth rate for 1992. However, this explanation could not 
account for the difference between industry and agriculture and between consumption and 
investment 
The varying responses to inflationary expectations and to IC growth can be the reason behind 
these differences. Traditionally, manufactured exports have higher income elasticities than 
primary commodity exports, and the implied recovery of industrialized countries in 1992 would 
22. The only exception is Industry Value Added which experiences an increasing growth rate as one proceeds from the low 
price scenario to the high oil price scenario but only for the case when IC growth is held constant. This underlies the 
responsiveness of the economy to the performance of its trading partners as is explained above. 
23. It must be recalled that there is only one scenario specified for 1992. The low, middle, and high scenarios still refer to the 
different cases for 1991, each of which, however, would have different implications for 1992. 
Table 24 
Summary of Results 
with constant IC growth 
Baseline Low Medium High Low Medium High 
GNP (growth rate) 
1 9 9 1 1 . 5 2 1 . 3 4 1 . 0 8 0 . 8 0 1 . 5 0 1 . 4 3 1 . 3 1 
1 9 9 2 3 . 5 2 3 . 3 6 3 . 5 8 3 . 9 7 3 . 4 5 3 . 6 9 4 . 1 0 
CPI (growth rate) 
1 9 9 1 1 3 . 3 9 1 3 . 3 3 1 4 . 1 1 1 5 . 4 9 1 3 . 5 4 1 4 . 5 6 1 6 . 1 6 
1 9 9 2 1 3 . 5 2 1 4 . 2 8 1 2 . 2 0 9 . 0 9 1 4 . 5 6 1 2 . 7 3 9 . 8 3 
BOP ($ million) 
1 9 9 1 2 1 0 7 1 9 7 2 1 5 1 0 8 3 0 2 0 5 7 1 6 9 0 1 0 8 9 
1 9 9 2 1 6 6 8 1 0 8 4 1 0 9 0 1 1 7 0 1 1 9 6 1 2 8 9 1 4 4 2 
Industry (growth rate) 
1 9 9 1 0 . 9 7 0 . 8 6 0 . 7 3 0 . 6 8 1 . 0 0 1 . 0 3 1 . 1 3 
1 9 9 2 3 . 1 5 3 . 3 0 4 . 1 1 5 . 3 1 3 . 2 2 3 . 9 0 5 . 0 1 
Agriculture (growth rate) 
1 9 9 1 1 . 7 3 1 . 5 2 1 . 0 2 0 . 3 9 1 . 7 1 1 . 4 4 1 . 0 2 
1 9 9 2 3 . 5 7 3 . 0 5 2 . 7 3 2 . 3 3 3 . 2 6 3 . 1 2 2 . 8 8 
Service (growth rate) 
1 9 9 1 2 . 6 3 2 . 4 6 2 . 2 1 1 . 9 6 2 . 6 2 2 . 5 6 2 . 4 7 
1 9 9 2 4 . 1 5 3 . 9 8 4 . 1 1 4 . 3 5 4 . 0 7 4 . 2 5 4 . 5 4 
Consumption (growth rate) 
1 9 9 1 3 . 7 4 3 . 7 2 3 . 6 3 3 . 5 1 3 . 7 3 3 . 6 5 3 . 5 4 
1 9 9 2 5 . 2 1 5 . 1 2 5 . 1 7 5 . 2 5 5 . 1 3 5 . 1 9 5 . 2 8 
Investment (growth rate) 
1 9 9 1 5 . 7 5 5 . 5 2 4 . 7 7 3 . 7 5 5 . 6 9 5 . 1 4 4 . 3 0 
1 9 9 2 7 . 7 8 6 . 8 1 6 . 5 1 6 . 1 6 7 . 0 7 7 . 0 2 6 . 9 1 
Exports (growth rate) 
1 9 9 1 7 . 6 5 6 . 5 8 5 . 3 3 3 . 9 7 7 . 6 1 7 . 3 3 6 . 0 9 
1 9 9 2 5 . 9 2 5 . 4 7 6 . 0 5 7 . 1 3 5 . 6 3 6 . 2 2 7 . 1 1 
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naturally translate into higher growth for the industry sector. Firms associated with the latter 
would also have the ability to respond more rapidly to shifts in price signals compared to agents 
in the agriculture sector. Lower inflation in 1992 would thus benefit the industry sector more 
than it would the agriculture sector. 
In the case of consumption and investment expenditure, the difference in their response to 
external factors maybe the dissimilarity of the dynamic lag structure of these two variables. 
Consumption behavior generally adjusts slowly over time. Investment spending responds more 
quickly to its past levels, indicating the flexibility of firms to adjust toward an optimum capital 
stock dictated by current economic conditions. 
VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The gains achieved in the early 1980s in reducing the country's dependence on imported 
energy seemed to have been wasted in the second half of the 1980s. In 1990, the degree of 
dependence on imported energy was higher than during the preceding four years, and 
approximated that of 1983. Moreover, the degree of dependence on the Middle East for crude oil 
imports has increased in the last few years. This will deteriorate further once the economy 
resumes its growth unless energy policy and programs are improved. 
Energy pricing policy deserves a closer attention. The character of the OPSF, which played a 
key role in the pricing of petroleum products, had been altered to include subsidy elements. 
Congress has mote than willing to do this to demonstrate at least one case to their constituents 
that they do have some interest in their economic plight. Of course, this is a costly way to 
accommodate, popular demands, especially at a time when government budget deficit already 
reached crisis proportion. Delays in the adjustments of domestic prices of petroleum products to 
reflect market conditions only succeeded in turning the OPSF into a heavy burden for the 
government without giving real relief to the country in general. While other countries, like 
Thailand, which acted quickly when world prices of crude oil soared, have already rolled back 
the prices of then1 petroleum products in view of the currently favorable crude oil price, the 
Philippines still trad to wait for six months before it could start considering oil price rollbacks 
because of the need to wipe out the huge OPSF deficit that was built up between August and 
December 1990. Oil pricing hasindeed become a highly politicized process in the country, to the 
detriment of fiscal prudence, resulting in inefficient use of scarce oil resources and increased 
uncertainty in business pricing and oil-related investments. It is unfortunate that the government 
has allowed itselfto fall into this trap. This is aggravated by the lack of an institutional leader 
such as a Department of Energy to advise the government on energy matters. It takes a strong 
will on the part of the government to institute energy policy reforms in order to bring itself out of 
the trap. 
The gulf crisis merely serves as a blunt reminder that energy policy and programs in this 
country need to be improved. The following, therefore, are the recommendations of this study: 
1. Institutional Arrangements 
Energy is vital; to the country's development It, therefore, needs substantial attention by the 
government through an institution that effectively addresses energy-related issues. The present 
Energy Coordinating Council (ECC) is unable to meet the demands of the energy sector. The 
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Executive Secretary who chairs the ECC lacks the necessary expertise and the time to oversee all 
activities of the government related to the energy sector. The Executive Director of the Office of 
Energy Affairs (OEA), on the other hand, is supposed to be the energy czar, but he is not 
perceived as such by members of the ECC. Lack of coordination in energy policy is a natural 
consequence of this institutional arrangement. It is, therefore, proposed that a Department of 
Energy be created whose head will be a member of the Cabinet The OEA shall serve as the 
backbone of this new Department with the PNOC, NPC, and NEA as attached agencies. A bill 
which was filed in Congress to this effect must be given full support by the administration. 
The proposed energy department should work toward lessening the country's dependence on 
imported energy. This means that more resources should be invested toward developing 
indigenous sources of energy, particularly geothermal. In 1987, the total geothermal production 
has made possible the displacement of about 7.81 million barrels of fuel oil equivalent^4. Given 
the financial constraint facing the country today, assistance from multilateral agencies and 
bilateral donorsjmay be sought to accelerate the development of indigenous energy sources and 
the building of power plants in already developed sites. The recent policy reforms in the energy 
sector, such as the liberalization of small-scale coal mining and the encouragement of private 
sector participation in the financing of capital-intensive power projects through cogeneration, 
build-own-operate and build- operate-transfer schemes, are steps in the right direction. 
Under the present energy development program, PNOC will explore, develop and maintain 
geothermal sites, and sell power- generating steam-from these sites to the NPC, which will build 
the geothermal plants. With its financial problem, NPC has not been able to build power plants in 
already developed sites. Thus, the PNOC which has been doing well financially should be 
allowed to build own power plants in developed geothermal sites, and later turn these plants over 
to the NPC once the latter becomes financially capable. 
2. Energy Pricing Policy 
Some steps have already been taken toward reforming the energy pricing policy to eliminate 
distortion in the allocation of energy resources and encourage energy conservation. For example, 
fuel oil subsidy to the NPC through the OPSF has been removed. The over-all price of petroleum 
products has been set at a level reflecting market conditions, although cross subsidization among 
different petroleum products still exist to address some social concerns. Yet, additional reforms 
must be taken. The plan to restructure electricity tariffs based on long-run marginal cost pricing 
must be refined and its implementation accelerated. The NPC must be able to generate its own 
funds to cope with its backlog in building geothermal plants. 
Oil price deregulation must be pursued seriously by the government once the OPSF deficit is 
eliminated. This will depoliticize oil pricing. Collusive arrangements among oil companies 
would not likely occur because of the presence of a government-owned corporation whose 
market share in the oil industry is quite substantial. The said corporation can also provide reliable 
cost data to check transfer pricing practices of the two multinational oil companies. The presence 
of a government-owned corporation in the oil industry may be necessary in the early years of oil 
price deregulation. However, once the authorities acquire the necessary expertise to monitor and 
24. Office of Energy Affairs, The Philippine Medium-Teim Energy Plan, 1988-1992. 
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regulate the oil industry, the government-owned corporation must be turned over to the private 
sector. 
The OPSF should only come in under well-specified and understood rules and circumstances. 
Preferably, the OPSF should be managed by a private group of consumers, business and oil 
refiners. It also needs to be segregated from the budget This means that oil taxation must 
always be through explicit taxes. 
The oil price deregulation needs complementary reforms in other areas, particularly exchange 
rate and monetary policy. A competitive and stable exchange rate should be pursued through 
prudent monetary policy. 
With the oil price deregulation and the restructuring of electricity tariffs, the Energy 
Regulatory Board may be abolished. 
3. Energy Conservation Program 
It is about time die government formulate and implement a systematic program on energy 
conservation even if there is no energy crisis. Many of the programs implemented during the 
gulf crisis could be permanently institutionalized. The program should include research and 
development of energy-saving technologies, A monitoring system should be developed to keep 
track of the implementation and results of energy conservation measures. 
62 
Annex A 
Central Bank of the Philippines 
Office of the Governor 
CIRCULAR NO. 1272 
Regulation of Foreign Exchange Position of Commercial Banks 
Hie Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 101 dated January 25, 1991 promulgated the following 
rules on the foreign exchange position of commercial banks 
SEC. 1. Basic Policy. As a general rule, banks shall maintain a balanced foreign exchange position. 
SEC. 2. Allowable Overbought Position. Banks* foreign exchange assets may only exceed foreign 
exchange liabilities, as both terms are defined in Sec. 3 hereof, provided the excess does not 
go beyond the average of their negotiated letters of credit for the immediately preceding 3 
months. 
Any resultant positive balance shall be sold on a daily basis. 
SEC. 3. Definitions. 
a. "Foreign exchange assets" shall include total monetary foreign assets under the Manual 
of Instructions of IOS Form I including the following: 
1. Loans and Discounts - Resident: Circular 343/547 - item 14; and 
2. Interbank Loan Receivables - Local: Item 15 
3. Investment in Bonds and Other Debt Instruments - Item 16 
Besides the Above, it shall also include as reported in SES1/6, Form 2A.1 CBP 7-16-05, the 
following: 
1. Spot Exchange Bought Net of Spot Exchange Sold; and 
2. Future Exchange Bought (including forward contracts). 
b. "Foreign exchange liabilities" shall include total monetary foreign liabilities under the 
Manual of Instructions of IOS Form I, except: 
1. Restructured foreign exchange obligations; and 
2. Due to Head Office/Branches/Agencies Abroad - Regular - Item 28 (only the 
amount which form part of needed assigned capital). 
It shall however include the following: 
1. Deposit Liabilities - Local Banks: Circular 343/547 - Item 32. 
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2. Special FX Deposits under GB FX Incentiie Circular - Regular - Item 33; 
3. Bills Payable - Local Banks: Circular 343/547 • Item 34; 
4. Bills payable - CB FX - Item 35; 
5. Accrued Interest and Other Expenses Payable - Item 37 
c. "Balanced foreign excnange position" snail reter to tne situation of a tank whose total 
foreign exchange liabilities is matched by its total foreign exchange assets. 
d. "Overbought foreign e*cftange position", shall refer to the situation of a bank whose 
foreign excliange assets exceed its total foreign exchange liabilities. 
e. "Oversold foreignexcriange position" shall refer to the situation of a bank whose total 
foreign exchange liabilities exceed its total foreign exchange assets. 
SEC. 4 Report& Commercial blanks stall submit daily reports in the attached format to the Foreign 
Exchange Regulations Department, copy furnished SES I. 
SEC. 5. Sanctions. Noncompliance with the provisions of this Circular and any misrcipraseatation or 
submission of false reports shall subject the bank and the officers concerned to the following 
sanctioKiKi 
a. First Offense 
Warning to/reprimand for the officers concerned and penalty on the bank at the 
rale of P5,000.00$er day until cancellation. < 
b. Second Offense 
Suspension of officers ftmwim m /v VOH4HHH usjro, «u|Muivii ui wieigii 
exchange operation of die bank for 30 calendar day^  and penalty on the bank at 
rateof P5,000.00per day lntil candellation. 
c. Subsequent Offenses 
Suspension of officer; concerned for 180 calendar days in addition to the 90 
calendar days suspension for secbttT bfffense, suspension of foreign exchange 
operation of the bank for 180 calendar days in addition tb the 30 calendar days 
suspension for second offense and p e n n on the bank at the rale of P5.000.00 per 
day for each violation. 
llie foregoing shall take effect on March l, 1991. 
(Sgdv)JOSE L CUISIA, JR. 
Governor 
January 28,1991 
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Central Bank of the Philippines 
Office of the Governor 
CIRCULAR NO. 1274 
Amending Circular 1272 on the Regulation of Foreign Exchange Position of Commercial Banks 
The Monetary Board in its Resolution No. 230 dated February 22,1991 approved the amendment of 
Scetions 2 and 3 of Circular 1272, so as to read in full as follows: 
"SEC. 2. Allowable Overbought Position. 
Banks' foreign exchange assets may be allowed to exceed their foreign excnange liabilities to the 
extent of their average monthly payments for merchandise imports and invisibles. Allowable retentions 
shall be computed based on average monthly transactions for the preceding 12 months as reported under 
IOS Form I. 
Banks shall be required to submit to the Foreign Exchange Regulations Department a-daily.report on 
their daily overboard/(oversold) foreign exchange position onthe third banking day from reference date 
and to settle their cumulative net overbought/(oversold) balance weekly. 
SEC.3. Definitions. 
a. "Foreign exchange assets" shall include total monetary foreign assetsifoderthe Manual 
of Instructions of IOS Form I including the following: 
1. Loans and Discounts • Resident: Circular 343/547 Item 14; and 
2. Interbank Loan Receivables - Local; Item 15 
3. Investment in Bonds and Other Debt Instruments - Item 16 
4. Forward Purchases from the Central Bank (Dollar - Peso Swap) 
b. "Foreign exchange liabilities" shall include total monetary foreign liajbilities under the 
Manual of Instructions of IOS Form I, except: 
L. Due to Head Office/tsrancnes/Agencies Abroad - regular - Item 28 (Unremitted 
Profits and Assigned Capital Portions only), 
"It shall include the following: 
1. Deposit Liabilities - Local Banks: Circular 343/547 - Regular - Item 32; 
2. Special FX Deposits under CB PTC Incentive Circular - Regular - Item 33; 
3. Bills payable - Local Banks: Circular 343/547 - Item 34; 
4. Bills payable - CB FX - Item 35" 
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c. "Balanced forei^vexghange position" shall refer to the situation of a bank whose total 
foreign exchange liabilities is matched by its total foreign exchange assets 
d "Overbought foreign, exchange position", shall refer to the situation of a bank whose 
total foreign exchange assets exceed its total foreign liabilities 
e ^bversold foreign exchange posiUon" shall refer to the situation of a bank whose total 
foreign exchange liabilities exceed its total foreign exchange assets 
All otherprovitfottfc of Circular 1272 shall remain unchanged 
(Sgd)JOSEL CUISIA JR 
Governor 
February 22 1991 
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Central Bank of the Philippines 
Office of the Governor 
CIRCULAR NO 1275 
Further Amending Circular 1272 on the Regulation of Foreign Exchange Position of 
Commercial Banks 
Pursuant to M B Resolution No 264 dated March 1 1991 the following further amendments to 
Section 3 (Definitions) of Circular 1272 as amended by Circular 1274 are hereby effected 
1 The exclusion of forward purchases without any corresponding restructured obligation, from 
consideration as part of a bank s foreign exchange assets under item 4 of Section 3 of Circular 1272 as 
amended by Circular 1274 This exclusion applies to overbought banks 
2 The addition as item no 5 of Section 3 (b) of Cash L/Cs collateralized with confirming bank" as 
part of foreign exchange liabilities 
3 The addition as Section 3 (f) of the following definition of "Cash L/Cs collateralized with 
confirming bank 
f Cash L/Cs collateralized with confirming bank shall mean those L/Cs where 
i the importer has delivered to the bank the 100% equivalent peso value of the 
importation at L/C opening 
u the foreign exchange has been effectively sold tot he unpoiter at UC opening i£ 
exchange rate is based on the spot selling rate as of date of payment, thereby 
freeing the importer from any exchange nsk, 
in the bank has advised the confirming bank that a portion of the issuing bank s 
foreign balance with the depository bank has been set aside and hypothecated for 
the L/C or remittance of foreign exchange has been made m advance to 
confirming bank to fund the L/C 
All other provisions of Circular 1272 as amended by Circular 1274 shall remain unchanged 
(Sgd)JOSEL CUISIA JR 
Governor 
March 4 1991 
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Annex B 
NATIONAL CONTINGENCY PLAN 
A ENERGY 
Scenario X 
1.To enact an Administration Bill institutionalizing energy conservation and enhancing 
efficient use of energy including reserve powers to the President during emergency 
situations (OP Congress) 
2 . To build up oil inventory level to the desired 90-*days supply (OEA PNOC 
£B/BAP) 
3. To firm up electricity load curtailment schedule (Multisectoral Task Force on Power 
Scheduling c/o NPC/ MERALCO DTI) 
4 .To review and adjust further if necessary the pciCPS af oil products (ERB) 
5. To firm up (including for Scenario Y) and implement further energy conservation 
measures (OEA) 
6- To cease the export of petroleum products and derivatives as necessary (ERB as lead 
agency, DTI) 
7. To *£&lerate the development and optimize the utilization of indigenous energy 
resources (OEA as lead agency DOST PNOC NPC NEA) 
8. To firm up the identification and ranking of non strategic establishments which are 
energy inefficient (OEA as lead agency DTI) 
9. To assess the long term need for oil refinery/storage capacity (ERB as lead agency 
OEA, PNOC) 
Scenario Y 
1 All measures in Scenario X 
2 To activate the ASEAN Petroleum Security Agreement (DFA^ 
3 To implement the energy/oil rationing plan (EOB) and electricity load curtailment 
schedule as appropriate (NPC MERALCO/Other private electric utilities 
NEA/RECs) 
4 To implement stringent energy conservation measures as appropriate (EOB OEA) 
5 To close as necessary non strategic establishments which are energy inefficient (ERB 
as lead agency OEA DTI DND) 
B PRODUCTION 
Scenario X 
1 To firm up plans to ensure adequate supply and delivery at reasonable prices of food 
staples,; basic commodities and essential farm production inputs including higher 
mvpptones; of such basic goods rationing schemes and further price controls as 
necessary (DA and DTI as lead agencics, NFA, DLG/LGUs) 
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2. To strengthen effectivity of Product Monitoring Program/ Bantay Bilihin Consumer 
Volunteer Network, including enforcement of measures against hording and 
profiteering (DTI as lead agency, DA). 
3. To firm up the energy/oil rationing plan for industries/ establishments in Coordination 
with all concerned (EOB as lead agency, DTI). 
Scenario Y 
1. All measures in Scenario X. 
2. To implement the plans for supply and delivery of basic goods (DA and DTI as lead 
agencies, NFA, DLG/LGUs). 
3. To implement the energy/oil rationing plan for industries/ establishments (EOB as 
lead agency, DTI). 
C. BASIC UTILITIES AND SERVICES 
Scenario X 
To firm up crisis plans for the provision/delivery of essential public utility services such 
as water (MWSS for Metro Manila and environs, LWUA/Water Districts and DPWH 
fpr other areas), transportation and communications (DOTC), etc. (Implementing 
Agencies (IAs)). 
Scenario Y 
1. All measures in Scenario X. 
2. To implement crisis plans for the provision/delivery of basic utility services (IAs). 
3. To slow down/suspend as appropriate implementation of non- urgent and 
energy-intensive infrastructure projects (IAs). 
D. SOCIAL CONCERNS 
Scenario X 
1. To firm up an evacuation plan including its funding for overseas workers (DFA as 
lead agency, DOLE). 
2. To implement measures to ensure industrial peace, e.g., wages (DOLE). 
3. To firm up plans to ensure provision and delivery of basic goods and services, 
especially to families below the poverty line (DSWD as lead agency/NGOs, DOH, 
DA/NNC). 
4. To implement income-augmenting measures (GSIS, SSS). 
5. To implement employment-generation schemes, including skills training and 
self-employment assistance (DOLE, DECS, DSWD, DTI, DA). 
6. To accelerate the implementation of the Balik-PrObinsiya Program (DSWD). 
7. To firm up guidelines for the implementation of a compressed schoOl/wortc week 
(DECS, DOLE, CSC for government employees, OP). 
8. To promote household/backyard production of foodcrops (DSWD, DECS, DA). 
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9. To expand rescheduling of housing amortization payments to .affected workers 
(HUDCC as lead agency, NHMFC, HDMF, SSS, GSIS). 
Scenario V 
1. All measures in Scenario X. 
2. To implement evacuation plan for overseas workers (DFA as lead agency, DOLE) 
and the plans for provision/delivery of basic goods/services (DSWD, as lead 
agency/NGOs, DOH, DA/NNC). 
3. To implement compressed school/work week (DECS, DOLE, CSC, OP). 
4. To effect strike/lockout moratorium (POLE). 
£. FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
Scenario X 
1. To ensure the availability of foreign exchange for the importation/payment of priority 
commodities/services (CB). 
2. To adjust the government's budgetary program consistent with macroeconomic 
objectives (DBM, DOF, Congress). 
3. To implement further anti-inflationary fiscal and monetary measures (Monetary 
Board). 
4. To continue holding on reserve as necessary unallocated funds and lumpsum 
allocations (DBM). 
5. To restructure the taxation system, including promulgation of new taxes where 
necessary (Congress, DOF). 
6. To extend credit selectively with priority to food production, energy-saving activities 
and employment-generating investments (CB, BAP). 
7. To continually negotiate for lower costs of externally-sourced capital (DOF). 
Scenario Y 
1. All measures in Scenario X. 
2. To allocate available foreign exchange to essential import requirements (CB/BAP). 
F. INFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC 
Scenarios X and Y (OPS) 
1. To continue keeping the public informed of developments. 
2. To intensify information campaign on energy conservation and compliance with 
government directives. 
3. To continue generating public understanding, support and cooperation. 
4. To continue building up public confidence in assuring that the Government is doing 
everything possible. 
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5. To continually allay public apprehensions and deter speculations, hoarding, and 
profiteering. 
6. To maintain an atmosphere of confidence, order and positive response through the 
identified role of each sector. 
G. SECURITY 
ScenarioX 
1. To firm up a security crisis management contingency plan in coordination with all 
concerned (NSC). 
2. To strengthen security of all vital facilities and installations in the country (DND). 
3. To maintain vigilance against various threat groups and intensify 
intelligence/counter-intelligence monitoring efforts (DND). 
Scenario Y 
1. All measures in Scenario X. 
2. To implement the security crisis management contingency plan (NSC). 
3. To quell/neutralize civil disturbances as necessary (DND). 
4. To mobilize AFP reserves (DND). 
OTHER ACTIONS REQUIRED 
1. To designate the NSC or appropriate government body to oversee and monitor the 
implementation of the National Contingency Plan for Scenarios X and/or Y (CP, 
NSC). 
2. To implement as necessary a program to finance the National Contingency Plan 
(DBM). 
3. To continue undertaking consultations as necessary in the firming up/formulation 
and/or implementation of the various plans/measures under the national contingency 
plan (IAs). 
4. To issue directives necessary to operationalize the National Contingency Plan (OP). 
M m C.I 
BASELINE RESULTS 
LEVELS GROUTH 
VARIABLES 1990 1991 1992 1991 1992 
A. Expenditures on Grots Domestic 
Product (Mil.P at 1972 prices) 
Total Consumption 
Private Consucpt i on 
Government Consumption 
94156.00 
83789.00 
10367.00 
97674.87 
88165.88 
9508.99 
102765.83 
92978.36 
9787.47 
3.74 
5.22 
•8.28 
5.21 
5.46 
2.93 
Gross D(nestle Capital 
Formation 
Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation 
18201.00 
18574.00 
19248.32 
19248.32 
20745.19 
20545.19 
5.75 
3.63 
7.78 
6.74 
Exports of Goods and 
Services 29055.00 31278.90 33130.72 7.65 5.92 
Inports of Goods and 
Services 37404.00 37868.43 39690.09 1.24 4.81 
Statistical Discrepancy 9882.00 1577.03 •938.33 
Gross Domestic Product 109890.00 111910.69 116013.33 1.84 3.67 
Net Factor Income from the 
Rest of the World 
•253.00 88.80 259.76 
Gross National Product 110143.00 111821.89 115753.56 1.52 3.52 
Gross Domestic Product by 
Industrial Origin 
Agriculture 29620.00 30132.80 31208.99 1.73 3.57 
Industry 
Manufacturing 
36220.00 
27259.00 
36571.37 
27567.31 
37723.26 
28496.04 
0.97 
1.13 
3.15 
3,37 
Service* 44050.00 45206.52 47081.08 2.63 4.15 
Gross Domestic Product 109890.00 111910.69 116013.33 1.84 3.67 
Employment and Uages 
Employment (full time 
equivalent) 
19707.40 19444.49 19573.28 -1.33 0.66 
Amex C.I (p.2) 
VARIABLES 1990 
LEVELS 
1991 1992 
GROWTH 
1991 1992 
Unemployment Rate (full 
tint equivalent) 
0.20 0.24 0.26 16.40 7.78 
Wages (Index, unskilled 
labor, 1972-100) 
492.70 534.35 583.88 8,45 9«27 
D. Money and Prices 
Consumer Price Index 
(1972-100) 
1054.53 1195.72 1357.39 13.39 13.52 
Ml (narrowly defined money) 87173.69 98716.29 114232.64 13.24 15.72 
M2 (broadly defined money) 290992.68 344093.52 381723.29 18.94 10<<29 
E. Government Budget 
Revenue 
Tax 
Hon*tax 
178000.00 
151100.00 
26900.00 
206397.64 
181797.50 
24600.14 
233779.62 
209631.85 
24147.77 
15.95 
20.32 
-8.55 
13.27 
15.31 
-1.84 
Overall Surplus/Deficit 
(•• X of GNP) 
3.68 3.04 2.34 
F. Trade and Balance of Payments 
Merchandise Exports 8055.77 8804.20 9778.36 9.29 11.06 
Merchandise Imports 12114;44 11903.86 12535.83 -U74 5.31 
Trade Balance -4058.67 -3099.65 -2757.4/ 
lion-Merchandise Trade, Inflow 4726.73 5161.70 5544.34 9.20 7.41 
Non-Merchandise Trade, Outflow 4417.50 4673.86 5077.72 5.80 8.64 
Current Account Balance -3057.44 •1834.81 •1582.84 
Balance of Payments -873.44 2107.19 1668.16 
73 
A m e x C.2 
RESULTS Of SIMULATIONS: LOU SCCMRIO 
PMCE*T-OlffE*E#CE 
LEVELS PERCENT GROWTH OVER BASELINE 
VARIABLES 1991 1992 1991 1992 1991 1992 
A. Expenditures on Grosa Domestlc 
Product (Mll.P at 1972 prices) 
Totsl Consult!on 
Privet* Consult (on 
Goverrnatt Cofsuifjllon 
97657.05 
• B & 
102658.30 
92924,30 
3.72 
5.20 
-8.29 
5.12 
5.42 
2.39 
-0.10182 
-0.0182 
•O.-OIA? 
-0.1046 
•0.0581 
-0.5464 
Gross DOCKS tic Capful 
Formation 
Gross Fixed Capital 
Format fttrf ' 
19205.11 
19205;11 
20dl3.«5 
203T3.«5 
5.52 
3.40 
- 6 . 8 1 
"5.77 
i0.2245 
-0.2245 
-T.1190 
-1.1299 
Exports of Goods and 
Services 30966.80 32660.03 6.58 5.47 -0.9978 •1.4207 
Impprts of Gotxfo and 
Services 37792.39 391901$* 1.04 3.70 -0.2008 -1.2593 
Statistical Discrepancy 1665.71 -994.64 5.6236 6.0013 
Gross Doanstlc Product 111732.29 115646.47 1.68 3.50 -0.1594 •0.3162 
Net Factor Incoae frc* the 
Rest of tMt World 
114.65 276.04 29.1167 6.2643 
GroSs National Product 11l6t7;64 115370^43* 1.34 3.36 -0<1827 •0.3310 
Gross OooteVtlcProduct by 
Industrial qrfgln 
Agrlcultura 3 0 0 6 9 , 1 5 3 0 9 9 5 , 0 7 1 . 5 2 3,05 - 0 . 2 1 1 2 •0.7175 
Industry 
Manufacturing 
36530,33 
27521.86 
37735,31 
28467.6$ 
0.86 
0.96 
3.30 
3.44 
•0.1122 
•0.1649 
0.0319 
-0.0996 
Services 45131.81 46926.09 2.46 3.98 ^ 1 6 5 3 -0.3292 
Gross Dcosstle Product 111617.64 115370.43 1.57 3.36 -0.2619 *Q.5S42 
Employment and Wages 
Eiployswnt (full time 
equivalent) 
19418.18 19488.04 -1.47 0.36 -0.1353 •0.4355 
74 
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PERCENT DIFFERENCE 
LEVELS PERCENT GROWTH OVER BASELINE 
VARIABLES 1991 1992 1991 1992 1991 1992 
Unemployment Rate (full 
time equivalent) 
0.24 0.26 16.89 8.67 0.4205 1.2485 
Wages (index, unskilled 
labor, 1972-100) 
534.17 585.67 8.42 9.64 •0.0324 0.3062 
Money and Prices 
Consumer Price Index 
(1972-100) 
1195.06 1365.72 13.33 14.2B •0.0557 0.6135 
Ml (narrowly defined money) 9B49B.77 114488.26 12.99 16.23 •0.2203 0.2238 
M2 (broadly defined money) 340205.07 354760.01 16.91 4.28 •1.7014 •7.0636 
Government Budget 
Revenue 
Tax 
Non-tax 
206352.37 
1B1760.49 
24591.88 
236574.76 
212404.01 
24170.75 
15.93 
20.29 
•8.58 
14.65 
16.86 
•1.71 
-0.0219 
-0.0204 
•0.0335 
1.1956 
1.3224 
0.0952 
Overall Surplus/Deficit 
(as X of GNP) 
3.OS 2.15 0.3517 •8.1325 
Trade and Balance of Payments 
Merchandise Exports 6703.87 9605.82 8.05 10.36 -1.1396 •1.7645 
Merchandise Imports 11934.97 12921.23 •1.48 8.26 0.2614 3.0744 
Trade Balance •3231.11 •3315.41 4.2408 20.2340 
Non-Merchandise Trade, Inflow 5161.50 5541.75 9.20 7.37 -0.0040 -0.0466 
Non-Merchandise Trade, Outflow 4675.70 5100.49 5.84 9.09 0.0393 0.4484 
Current Account Balance -1969.31 •2166.15 7.3302 36.8515 
Balance of Payments 1972.69 1084.85 -6.3827 -34.9669 
Amex C.3 
RESULTS OF SIMULATIONS: LOU SCENARIO UITN CONSTANT IC" GROWTH 
PERCENT DIFFERENCE 
LEVELS PERCENT GROWTH OVER BASELINE 
VARIABLES 1991 1992 1991 1992 1991 1992 
A. Expenditures on Gross Domestic 
Product (Nil.P at 1972 prices) 
Total Consumption 
Private Consumption 
Government Consumption 
97666.49 
88165.16 
9501.33 
102677.02 
92961.31 
97,15,71 
3.73 
5.22 
•8.35 
5.13 
5.44 
2.26 
-0.0086 
-0.0008 
-Q.0806 
. -0.0864 
•0.0183 
-0.7332 
Gross Domestic Capital 
Formation 
Grosa Fixed Capital 
FormatIan 
19236.34 
19236.34 
20596.61 
20396.61 
5.69 
3.57 
7.07 
6.03 
-0.0622 
-0.0622 
•0.7162 
-0.7232 
Exports of Goods and 
Services 31267.35 33028.26 7.61 5.63 •0.0369 •0.3093 
Imports of.Goods and 
Services 37828.44 
S 
39263.24 1.13 3.79 •0.1056 -1.0754 
Statistical Discrepancy 1569.07 •1125.93 -0.5049 19.9931 
Gross Domestic Product 111910.82 115912.71 1.84 3.58 0.0001 -0.0867 
Net Factor Income from the 
Rest of the World 
115.03 255.12 29.5485 -1.7866 
Gross National Product 111795.78 115657.58 1.50 3.45 •0.0233 •0.0829 
Gross Domestic Product by 
Industrial Origin 
Agriculture 30126.89 31108.31 1.71 3.26 -0.0196 -0.3226 
Industry 
Manufacturing 
36580.59 
27572.22 
37759.04 
28508.93 
1.00 
1.15 
3.22 
3.40 
0.0252 
0.0178 
0.0948 
0.0453 
Services 45203.34 47045.36 2.62 4.07 •0.0070 •0.0759 
Gross Domestic Product 111910.82 115912.71 1.84 3.58 0.0001 -0.0867 
Employment and Wages 
Employment (full time 
equivalent) 
19439.49 19544.68 •1*36 0.54 •0.0257 -0.1461 
76 
Annex C 7 (p 2} 
VARIABLES 
PERCENT DIFFERENCE 
LEVELS PERCENT GROWTH OVER BASELINE 
1991 1992 1991 1992 1991 1992 
Unemployment Rate (full 
tine equivalent) 
Wages (Index, unskilled 
labor, 1972-100) 
D. Money and Prices 
Consuner Price Index 
(1972*100) 
Ml (narrowly defined money) 
M2 (broadly defined money) 
E. Government Budget 
Revenue 
Tax 
Non-tax 
Overall Surplus/Oeflclt 
(as X of GNP) 
F. Trade and Balance of Payments 
Merchandlae Exports 
Merchandise Imports 
Trad* Balance 
Non-Merchandise Trade, Inflow 
Non-Merchandise Trade, Outflow 
Current Account Balance 
Balance of Paymenta 
0.24 0.26 
534.70 587.22 
1197.27 1371.59 
98804.55 115185.88 
343711.18 360081,83 
206779.64 237560.92 
182173.23 213348.28 
24606.41 24212.64 
3.01 
8800.56 
11947.71 
-3147.16 
5162.66 
4676.45 
•1884.95 
2057.05 
2.07 
9744.52 
12948.49 
•3203.97 
5543.91 
5102.10 
•2054.16 
1196.84 
16.50 8.15 0.0841 0.4292 
8.52 9.82 0.0655 0.5717 
13.54 14.54 
13.34 16.58 
18.12 4.76 
16.17 
20.56 
•8.53 
9.22 
5.86 
14.89 
17.11 
-1.60 
9.25 10.73 
•1.38 8.38 
7.38 
9;10 
0.1293 1.0464 
0.0894 0.8345 
•0.6683 -5.6694 
0.1851 1.6175 
0.2067 1.7728 
0.0255 0:2686 
•1.0682 -11.4957 
•0.0414 -0.3461 
0.3684 3.2918 
1.5325 16.1926 
0.0185 -0.0077 
0.0554 0.4802 
2.732$ 29:7762 
-2.3793 -28.2534 
< m n C.4 
RESULTS OF S n O U T I O K t NIBBLE SCENARIO 
PERCENT DIFFERENCE 
LEVELS PERCENT GROWTH OVER BASELINE 
VARIABLES 1991 1992 1991 1992 1991 1992 
A. Expenditures on Gross Domestic 
Product (Ml U P at 1972 prices), 
Total Consult ion 
Private Consumption 
Government Consult ion 
97576.04 
88116.93 
9459.12 
102620.09 
92882.67 
9737.42 
3.63 
5.17 
•8.76 
5.17 
5.41 
2.94 
•0.1012 
•0.0555 
•0.5245 
-0.1418 
•0.1029 
•0.5114 
Gross Domestic Capital 
Formation 
Gross Fftted Capltal 
Formation 
19069.30 
19069.30 
20310.94 
20110.94 
4.77 
2.67 
6.51 
5.46 
•0.9301 
-0.9301 
-2.0932 
•2.1136 
Exports of Goods and 
Services 30603.76 32456.30 5.33 6.05 '2.0356 
loports of Coeds and 
services. 37440.41 38925*58 0.10 3.97 •1.1303 •1.9262 
statistical Discrepancy 1620.09 -868.62 2.7304 -7.4290 
Gross Domestic Product 111428.77 115599*13 1.40 3.74 -0.4306, -Q..3622 
Net Factor Income from the 
Rest of the World 
100.60 278.64 13.2699 7.2648 
Gross National Product 111326.18 115314.49 1.08 3.58 •0.4415 •0.3793 
Gross Domestic Product by 
Industrial Origin 
Agriculture 29922.70 30740.59 1.02 2^73 -0.6972 -1-5008 
Industry 
Manufacturing 
36483.90 
27463.45 
3 7 9 8 2 ^ 
28585.41 
0.73 
0.75 
4.11 
4.09 
•0.2392 
•0.3768 
0.6864 
0.3136 
Services 45022.17 46870.33 2.21 4.11 •0.4078 •0.4476 
Gross Domestic product 111428.77 115593.13 1.40 3.74 •0.4306 -0.3622 
Employment and Wages 
Employment (full time 
equivalent) 
19373.89 19402.06 •1.69 0.15 -0.3631 •0.8748 
78 
Annex C 7 (p 2} 
VARIABLES 
LEVELS 
1991 1992 
PERCENT 
1991 
GROWTH 
1992 
PERCENT DIFFERENCE 
OVER BASELINE 
1991 1992 
Unemployment Rate (full 
time equivalent) 
0.24 0.26 17.77 9.23 1.1775 2.5361 
Wages (Index, wskIliad 
labor, 1972-100) 
536.03 582.61 8.79 8.69 0*3148 -0.2178 
D. Honey and Prices 
Consumer Price Index 
(1972-100) 
1203.31 1350.13 14.11 12.20 0.6347 -0.5346 
Ml (narrowly defined money) 98834.82 113327.21 13.38 14.66 0.1201 -0.7926 
H2 (broadly defined money) 319214.18 350398.34 9.70 9.77 -7.7665 -8.2062 
E. Government Budget 
Revenue 
Tax 
Non-tax 
208700.53 
184078.99 
24621.54 
234849.44 
210733.67 
24115.77 
17.25 
21.83 
•8,47 
12.53 
14.48 
•2.05 
1.1158 
1.2550 
0.0870 
0.4576 
0.5256 
-0.1325 
Overall Surplus/Deficit 
(as X of GNP) 
2.86 2.29 -5.9920 -2.1538 
F. Trade and Balance of Payments 
Merchandise Exports 8567.11 9526.91 6.35 11.20 -2.6929 -2.5715 
Merchandise Inports 12240.63 12840.09 1.04 4.90 2.8291 2.4272 
Trade Balance -3673.51 •3313.19 18.5137 20.1532 
Non-Merchandise Trade, Inflow 5159.85 5540.11 9.16 7.37 -0.0358 •0.0763 
Non-Merchandise Trade, Outflow 4693.75 5095.69 6.25 8.56 0.4257 0.3540 
Current Account Balance -2431.42 -2160.77 32.5160 36.5119 
Balance of Payments 1510.58 1090,23 
1 
-28.3129 -34.6447 
Jtl MP SIMJLATIONS: MOOLE SCEMMIO WITH COOTAVT IC 00111 
PERCENT DIFFERENCE 
LEVELS PERCENT GROWTH OVER BASELINE 
VARIABLES 1991 1992 1991 1992 1991 1992 
A. Expenditures on Gross Doatstlc 
Product cm U P at 1972 prlcaa) 
Total Consult ion 
Private Contortion 
Gavamatnt Gawaptlcn 
97596.41 
88150.01 
9446.40 
102656.95 
92956.60 
9700.35 
3.65 
5.20 
•8.88 
5.19 
5.45 
2.69 
-0.0803 
-0.0180 
•0.6583 
•0.1060 
•0.0234 
-0.8901 
Groat Domatlc Capital 
Formation 
Grata Fixad Capital 
Formation 
19136.31 
19136.31 
20479.67 
20279.67 
5.14 
3.03 
7.02 
5.97 
-0.5819 
'0.5819 
•1.2799 
-1.2924 
Exports of Goods and 
Services 31185.35 33126.52 7.33 6.22 -0.2991 •0.0127 
lifiorta of Goods and 
Sarvlcaa . 37517.83 39070.08 0.30 4.14 •0.92S9 •1.5621 
Statistical Dlscrspancy 1413.20 -1094.49 •10.3884 16.6423 
Gross O w a t l c Product 111813.74 116098.56 1.75 3.83 •0.0866 0.0735 
Not Factor Income from tha 
Rest of tha World 
97.06 257.11 9.3056 -1.0212 
Gross National Product 111716.68 115841.45 1.43 3.69 -0.0941 0.0759 
Gross Oowatlc Product fay 
Industrial Origin 
Agriculture 30045.80 30982.50 1.44 3.12 -0.2887 -0.7257 
Industry 
Manufacturing 
36592.33 
27574.24 
38820.87 
28658.00 
1.03 
1.16 
3.90 
3.93 
0.0573 
0.0251 
0.7889 
0.5684 
Services 45175.60 47095.19 2.56 4.25 •0.0684 0.0300 
Grata 0 Mantle Product 111813.74 116098.56 1.75 3.83 -0.0866 0.0735 
Exptoy—nt and Usgaa 
Esploy—nt (full tl«a 
aqulvalant) 
19420.20 19512.31 •1.46 0.47 -0.1249 -0.3115 
Annex C.5 (p.Z) 
VEFTCRTTT DIFFERENCE 
LEVELS .. PERCENT GROWTH OVER BASELINE 
VARIABLES 1991 1992 1991 1992 1991 1992 
Unemployment Rate (full 
time equivalent) 
0.24 0.26 16.84 8.34 0.3785 -- -0.8974 
Wages (index, unskilled 
labor, 1972-100) 
537.15 585,71 9.02 9.84 - 0.5240 073128 
Honey and Prides 
Consuner Price Inde;. 
(1972-100) 
1206.04 1361.78 14.56 12.73 1.0298 0.3238 
HI (narrowly defined money) 99496.55 114665.79 14.14 15.25 0.7904 Q;3792 
H2 (broadly defined money) 326646.33 360110.78 12.25 10.24 •5.6191 -5.6618 
Government Budget 
Revenue 
Tax 
Hon-tax 
209626.73 
184973.95 
24652.78 
236768.85 
2125&9.75 
24199.10 
17.77 
22.42 
•B.35 
12.95 
14.92 
-1,84 
1.S64S 
1.7472' 
0.2140 
1:2787 
iifiols 
0.2125 
Overall Surplus/Deficit 
(as X of GNP) 
2.77 2.13 •8.9995 •8.7991 
Trade and Balance of Payments 
Merchandise Exports 8775.06 9779.58 8.93 11.45 •0.3310 0.0125 
Merchandise Imports 12269.22 12894.02 1.28 5.09 3.0693 2.8574 
Trade Balance -3494.16 -3114.44 12^275 12.WS8 
Nan-M6rchandise Trade, Inflow 5162.35 5544.21 9.22 7.40 0.0126 -0i00£4 
Non-Merchandise Trade, Outflow 4695.44 5098,88 6.29 8.59 0.4619 0VM68 
Current Account Balance -2251.26 -1961.12 22.6969 23.8982 
Balance of Payments 1690.74 1289.88 -19.7631 -22.6761 
A m e x C.6 
RESULTS OF SIKIIATIONS: HIGH SCENARIO 
PERCENT DIFFERENCE 
LEVELS PERCENT GROWTH OVER BASELINE 
M U M B L E S 1991 1992 1991 1992 199} 1992 
A. ffiqfertt1ttir«».«n G r o w Domestic * 
Product (NfL.P at 1972 prices) 
Total Consumption 
Private Consumption 
S o w r n a M Consumption 
97461.33 
88079.79 
9M1*$4 
102582.35 
92848.90 
9733.45 
3.51 
5.12 
-9.51 
5.25 
5.41 
3.75 
-0.0976 
"1-3403 
-0.1785 
•0.1392 
-p.55\9 
Gross Domestic Capital 
Fonm^tlM 
Gross Fixed Capital 
Foraatkfi 
18884.33 20048^41 
19fl4M«!-
3.75 
1.67 
4-16 
FIJ^I 
-1.89J.Q, • 
-fcB9U» 
-3,JS87 
-3.3914 
Exports of Goods and 
Services 30209.33 32363.24 3.97 7.13 •3.4195 -2.3165 
Jtynrts eft'Ooads end 
Sesvtees i ' 36909,07 38547^9 -1.32 4.44 -2.5334 -2,8796 
Statisticdlllisorepancy 1471 ;87 -742v47 <*<6682 • •20.8729 
Gross Doaestlc Product 111118.79 115704.34 1.12 4.13 -0.7076 •0.2663 
Net Factor Income from the 
Kaftt of M k l M r l d 
90.85 270.81 2.3128 4.2507 
«POSS National Product 111Q27V94. 115433453-' 0.80 3.97 •0*710® T0,2Z65 
GP*ss Doie*tU l*roduct by 
Industrial Origin 
Agriculture 29736.88 30429.32 0.39 2.33 -1.3139 •2.4982 
Industry 
• Monufait&Nng 
36466.75 
27425;97i-
38404.56 
28612.48) 
0.68 
0.61 
5.31 
5»06j 
-0.2861 
'0*5127 
1.8060 
1.1105 
SePvlbes't 44915W17 46870*65 1.96 4.35, >9*6445 -£«4474 
Gross Doaestic Product 111118.79 115704.34 1.12 4.13 -0.7076 -0.'2663 
Enployment and Wages 
Enployment (full tl«e 
equivalent) 
19320.20 19303.50 -1.96 -0.09 -0.6392 •1.3783 
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A m m C.6 ( p J ) 
VARIABLES 
LEVELS 
1991 1992 ^1991* 
GROWTH 
1992 
PERCENT DIFFERENCE 
OWBI BASELINE 
1991 1992 
UnMployaant tats (full 
t t m equivalent) 
0.24 0.27 18.80 9.81 2.0606 3.9797 
I t e m (Index, unskilled 
labor, 1972-100) 
539.31 578.63 9.46 7.29 0.9320 •0.9006 
D . Honey and Prices 
Consumer Price Index 
(1972-100) 
1217.90 1328.59 15.69 9.09 1.8550 •2.1215 
HI (narrowly defined aaney) 99603.73 111909.21 14.26 12.35 0.8998 •2*0339 
M2 (broadly defined aonsy) 288166.32 346743.78 •0.97 20.33 •16.7374 •9.1636 
E> Government Budget 
Revenue 
Tax 
Hen* tax 
212795.09 
188115.69 
24679.40 
232715*90 
208661.68 
26056.22 
19.55 
24.50 
•8.26 
9.36 
10.92 
•2.53 
3.0996 
3.6756 
0.3222 
•0.4550 
•0.4688 
-0.3874 
Overall Surplus/Oaf lot t 
(as X of GUP) 
2.52 2.67 -17.0983 5.4274 
P. Trad* and Balance of Pay—nU 
Norchandlao Exports 8431.85 9488.10 4.67 12.53 -4.2293 •2.9686 
Narehandlsa laports 12753.46 12727.17 5.27 -0.21 7.1372 1.5263 
Trade Balanea -4321.61 •3239.07 39.4223 17.4656 
Hon-Merchandise Trade, Inflow 5158.23 5538.95 9.13 7.38 •0.0674 •0.0972 
Hon*Merchandise Trade, Outflow 4726.05 5089.82 6.96 7.73 1.0760 0.2226 
Currant Account Balance •3111.46 -2061.14 69.5785 31.4611 
Balanea of Payments 830.56 1169.86 -60.5846 •29.8711 
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A m e s C 7 
RESULTS OF SIMULATIONS HIGH SCENARIO UITN CONSTANT IC GKOUTN 
PERCENT DIFFERENCE 
LEVELS PERCENT GROWTH OVER BASELINE 
VARIABLES 1991 1992 1991 1992 1991 1992 
A Expenditures cm Gross Domestic 
Product (Nil P at 1972 prlcts) 
Total Consult Ion 
Private Consult ion 
Government Consumption 
97492 
88129 
9362 
10 
53 
56 ill 09 36 73 3 5 9 54 18 69 5 5 3 28 48 39 0 0 1 1871 0412 5999 0 0 1 1253 0226 1009 
Gross Domaatlc Capital 
Formation 
Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation 
18983 
18983 
10 
10 
20294 
20094 
77 
77 
4 
2 
30 
20 
6 
5 
91 
86 
1 
1 
3779 
3779 
2 
2 
1712 
1923 
Exports of Goods and 
Services 31058 12 33290 48 6 89 7 19 0 7058 0 4822 
Imports of Goods and 
Services 37022 4V 38758 08 1 02 4 69 2 2339 2 3482 
Statistical Discrepancy 1181 12 1029 49 25 1048 9 7154 
Groaa Domestic Product 111691 95 116434 77 1 64 4 25 0 1955 0 3633 
Net Factor Income from the 
Reat of the llorld 
108 85 280 05 22 5855 7 8094 
Gross National Product 111583 10 116154 72 1 31 4 10 0 2135 0 3466 
Gross Domestic Product by 
Industrial Origin 
Agriculture 29922 77 30783 84 1 02 2 88 0 6970 1 3622 
Industry 
Manufacturing 
36630 
27589 
10 
19 
38464 
28914 
K 
—
 
<# in 
1 
1 
13 
21 
5 
4 
01 
80 
0 
0 
1606 
0793 
1 
1 
9649 
4685 
Services 
£ in 08 47186 46 2 47 4 54 0 1492 0 2238 
Gross Domestic Product 111691 95 116434 77 1 64 4 25 0 1955 0 3633 
Employment and Wages 
Employment (full time 
equivalent) 
19386 52 19458 05 1 63 0 37 0 2981 0 5887 
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PERCENT DIFFERENCE 
LEVELS PERCENT GROWTH OVER BASELINE 
VARIABLES 1991 1992 1991 1992 1991 1992 
Unemployment Rate (full 
time equivalent) 
0 24 0 26 17 52 8 58 0 9672 1 7167 
Wages (Index unskilled 
labor 1972«100) 
540 98 583 08 9 80 7 78 1 2421 0 1370 
Money and Prlcea 
Consumer Price Index 
(1972-100) 
1224 91 1345 30 16 16 9 83 2 a n 0 8904 
Ml (narrowly defined money) 100574 10 113790 86 15 37 13 14 1 8820 0 3867 
M2 (broadly defined money) 298653 08 360018 43 2 63 20 55 13 7074 5 6860 
Government Budget 
Revenue 
Tax 
Non tax 
214160 
189435 
24725 
32 
11 
21 
235442 
211268 
24173 
03 
63 
40 
20 
25 
8 
31 
37 
08 
9 
11 
2 
94 
53 
23 
3 
4 
0 
7610 
2012 
5084 
0 
i> 
0 
7111 
7808 
1061 
Overall Surplus/Deficit 
(as X of GNP) 
2 39 2 24 21 3549 4 2137 
Trade and Balance of Payments 
Merchandise Exports B735 15 9837 81 8 43 12 62 0 7843 0 6080 
Merchandise Imports 12798 77 12805 81 5 65 0 06 7 5178 2 1537 
Trade Balance 4063 62 2968 00 31 0990 7 6350 
Non Merchandise Trade Inflow 5161 87 5544 70 9 21 7 42 0 0033 0 0065 
Non Merchandise Trade, Outflow 4726 73 5093 67 7 00 7 76 1 1313 0 3141 
Current Account Balance 2852 48 1808 97 55 4644 14 2859 
Balance of Payments 1089 52 1442 03 48 2950 13 5553 
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